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NOTES

The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case
THE TREASON CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
“Civis Romanus sum”1

INTRODUCTION
During March 2013, a legal question dominated the U.S.
news cycle: “Does the President have the authority to use a
weaponized drone to kill an American not engaged in combat
on American soil?” 2 This inquiry represents the paramount
question in American constitutional balancing: the total
deprivation of a citizen’s life, liberty, and property3 by secret,
1 In Rome, a citizen accused of any crime would need merely utter “civis
Romanus sum,” “I am a Roman citizen,” to avoid judicial process as a non-citizen. See
Acts 22, 27 (King James). While preaching in Damascus, the apostle Paul avoids being
immediately whipped by a centurion for zealous demagoguery by asserting his
citizenship and, in subsequent chapters, is afforded appellate process—all the way to
Caesar. Id. at 22-28.
2 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Attorney General to Sen. Rand Paul (Mar. 7,
2013) [hereinafter March 7 Holder Letter], reprinted in Daniel Hapler, Holder’s Letter
to Rand Paul, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.weeklystandard.com/
blogs/holders-letter-rand-paul-no-us-cant-use-drone-kill-citizen-not-engaged-combatus-soil_706587.html.
3 For example, the Government handling of Anwar al-Aulaqi resulted in the
deprivation of: his life, by virtue of his death by droning; his liberty, e.g., by the
restriction on his right to travel; and his property, by the subjection of his assets to
total seizure and forfeiture (and to the disinherision of his heir working a prohibited
corruption of blood). Mark Mazzetti et al., Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki
in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011) (describing al-Aulaqi’s droning by U.S. order and
process), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-alawlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all; see infra Part V.A.2.b (discussing the
restrictions on liberty of movement by virtue of governmental lethal targeting in Yemen);
Designation of ANWAR AL-AULAQI Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and the Global
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233-01 (July 23, 2010)
[hereinafter al-Aulaqi Designation]; infra Parts I.A.3 & IV.B (discussing the constitutional
guarantee that a traitor’s forfeited assets will go to the traitor’s heirs).
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unreviewable executive order4 weighted against the presidential
duty and power to defend the people from warlike assault.5 In
responding to this question, Attorney General Eric Holder denied
that the President had this authority to kill Americans without
process, but his response contained the seemingly innocuous
qualifier that “[the American must] not [be] engaged in
combat.”6 Moreover, on March 4, 2013, Holder affirmed that in
response to circumstances like the Pearl Harbor or September
11 attacks, the President may “authorize lethal force, such as a
drone strike, against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil, and without
trial.”7 The distinction between when the President may and
may not so deprive a citizen’s liberty appears to hinge upon
whether the citizen is conducting a war or engaging in combat
against the United States.
While drawing this important distinction, Holder likely
was cognizant of the favorable case law on the federal power to
conduct drone strikes—case law that would almost
undoubtedly permit the unreviewable, executively ordered
droning of CIA designated terrorist suspects on U.S. soil without
trial, 8 and that absolutely permits doing so on foreign soil. 9
Federal case law defines terrorist acts by enemy combatants as
“levying war [against the United States],” 10 and declares the
lethal targeting of terrorist subjects a nonjusticiable political

4 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that the
lethal targeting of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi is a nonjusticiable political question).
5 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8; 3 (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” and
respectively, “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”).
6 March 7 Holder Letter, supra note 2.
7 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Attorney General to Sen. Rand Paul (Mar. 4,
2013), available at http://www.paul.senate.gov/files/documents/BrennanHolderResponse.pdf.
8 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47 (applying the political question
doctrine); John C. Dehn & Kevin John Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of
Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 185-87 (2011), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/TargetedKilling.pdf.
9 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47.
10 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 149-60 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000); accord United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105,
1117 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012); United States v. Awadallah,
349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied; Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056
(2005) (“The particular governmental interests at stake therefore were the indictment
and successful prosecution of terrorists whose attack, if committed by a sovereign,
would have been tantamount to war, and the discovery of the conspirators’ means,
contacts, and operations in order to forestall future attacks”); United States v.
Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987).
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question.11 The legal basis for this power was recently affirmed
in the 2010 case al-Aulaqi v. Obama.12
On September 30, 2011, Anwar al-Aulaqi13 was struck
“by ‘a barrage of Hellfire missiles’ fired from a [predator]
drone.” 14 At the time, he was traveling by car on a deserted
Yemeni highway with fellow U.S. citizen, and “proud” traitor,
Samir Khan.15 The killing followed a fact-finding and a legal
determination by the CIA that al-Aulaqi should die.16 No U.S.
court ever found al-Aulaqi guilty of any violent crime.17
Nevertheless, the President ordered al-Aulaqi’s killing18
because he was the “leader of external operations” in the
terrorist organization al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
al-Qaeda’s “most active operational affiliate.”19 Al-Aulaqi’s killing
prompted his family 20 to bring two federal lawsuits as
representatives, al-Aulaqi v. Obama and al-Aulaqi v.

Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47 (applying the political question doctrine).
Id. at 1.
13 Anwar’s last name has been spelled many ways, most commonly “alAwlaki,” “Awlaki,” “al-Awlaqi,” or “al-Aulaki.” Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (quoting
Samir Khan). This note uses “al-Aulaqi” because this is how the family and the District
Court for the District of Columbia spells the name. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d
at 1; Complaint at ¶ 9, Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:10-cv-01469) [hereinafter AlAulaqi Complaint].
14 Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination & Targeted Killing—A Historical and PostBin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 259, 330 (2011) (citing Mazzetti et al.,
supra note 3).
15 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (quoting Samir Khan).
16 Benjamin McKlevey, Note, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of
Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power, 44 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1358-59 (2011) (describing briefly the CIA process for approving
kill list status). See generally Tara McKlevey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 21, 2011, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/13/insidethe-killing-machine.html.
17 See infra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the entirety of alAulaqi’s criminal record).
18 Islamist Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, B.B.C. NEWS (Sept. 30,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15121879; see also McKlevey, Due
Process Rights, supra note 16, at 1358 (noting the National Security Council’s approval
of the use of lethal force).
19 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (“‘The death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al
Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate . . . [al-Aulaqi took] the lead role in planning
and directing the efforts to murder innocent Americans.’” (quoting Barak Obama,
President, Remarks at the Swearing-In Ceremony for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Gen. Martin E. Dempsey (Sept. 30, 2011))).
20 These lawsuits were filed by family members purporting to be the
representatives of the individuals allegedly placed on the CIA’s kill list, see Al-Aulaqi
Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 9 (asserting third party standing); however, the
question of third-party standing to bring such challenges, like the merits of the
challenge, remains open. Complaint at ¶¶ 10, 41-3, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv01192-RMC (D.C. Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Panetta Complaint]. The implications of
third-party standing are discussed infra at Part IV.B.
11
12
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Panetta.21 The first of these suits, al-Aulaqi v. Obama, sought
to enjoin the CIA from placing al-Aulaqi on a “kill list[ ].”22 The
suit posed novel questions regarding the constitutionality of
using such force against U.S. citizens overseas. 23 Al-Aulaqi v.
Panetta has not yet been resolved. Many scholars have
questioned the Executive’s unilateral—and apparently
unreviewable—power to order the targeted killing of citizens
who have not been found guilty of any crime by any U.S. court.24
Fear over the abuse of government power to execute
citizens for capital offenses motivated the inclusion of the
Treason Clause in the Constitution:

See generally, e.g., Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1; Panetta Complaint, supra note 20.
Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
23 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (“Stark, and perplexing, questions
readily come to mind, including the following: How is it that judicial approval is
required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic
surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the
United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death?”); see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he
Government . . . cannot be compelled by this court of law to explain . . . the reasons
why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but after careful
and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I
cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules—a veritable
Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively
allow the Executive Branch . . . to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that
seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the
reasons for its conclusion a secret.”).
24 See generally, e.g., Ryan Patrick Alford, The Rule of Law at the Crossroads:
Consequences of Targeted Killing of Citizens, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2011)
(discussing the parallels between medieval law and modern treason law); Carlton F.W.
Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2006) (arguing that the Treason Clause provides for
criminal process of how U.S. citizen-enemy combatants should be treated); Michael
Ramsey, Meet the New Boss, Continuity in Presidential War Powers, 35 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 863 (2012) (arguing that the Constitution requires that persons in alAulaqi’s situation be tried for Treason under Article III); Philip Dore, Comment,
Greenlighting American Citizens: Proceed With Caution, 72 LA. L. REV. 255, 257 (2011)
(arguing that “the foreign murder statute prohibits the targeted killing of Anwar alAwlaki.”); Mike Dreyfuss, Note, My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The
Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, 65 VAND. L. REV. 249, 273
(2012) (arguing that Procedural Due Process demands only that a person in al-Aulaqi’s
situation receives notice, and an opportunity to be heard if that person surrenders to
authorities); Abraham U. Kannof, Comment, Dueling Nationalities: Dual Citizenship,
Dominant and Effective Nationality, And The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, 25 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 1371, 1415 (2011) (arguing that al-Aulaqi should not be treated as a U.S.
citizen for constitutional purposes, but a Yemeni citizen, and afforded the attendant
protections); Lindsay Kwoka, Comment, Trial By Sniper: The Legality of Targeted
Killing In the War on Terror, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 301 (2011) (arguing that under the
Mathews test and Hamdi, there is a minimum Fifth Amendment Due Process right to
appear before a neutral decision-maker); McKlevey, supra note 16 (arguing that under
the Mathews test and Hamdi, the current policy regarding targeted killing without
notice and an opportunity to be heard violates minimum due process rights).
21
22
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Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession
in open Court. The Congress shall have Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted.25

Enshrined in the Constitution is a single, necessary and
sufficient definition of what acts constitute treason. The word
“traitor” is a powerful epithet that conjures images of historic
villains like Benedict Arnold, Ephialtes,26 or Judas Iscariot. It is
this animus—and the historically demonstrable potential for
tyrannical abuse of a government’s power to punish treacherous
wrongdoers27—that galvanized the Founding Fathers to include
the “fundamentally restrictive” Treason Clause28 and to tout it
as an instrument of liberty.29
It is, however, unclear precisely what the Treason Clause
demands in a situation like al-Aulaqi’s.30 All other things equal,
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
Ephialtes showed the Persians the path to route the Spartans at
Thermopylae. HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES, bk. 7, ch. 213, § 1 (John Marincola, ed.,
Aubrey De Selincourt, trans., Penguin ed., 1996).
27 Larson, supra note 24 at 873 (quoting James Wilson) (“This punishment
[execution], and the description of this crime, are the great sources of danger and
persecution, on the part of government, against the citizen. Crimes against the state!
and against the officers of the state! History informs us that more wrong may be done
on this subject than on any other whatsoever.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF
TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: COLLECTED ESSAYS, 143 (Stanley I. Kitler, ed., 1971)
(quoting Rufus King). As to animus, one merely needs to look at the statute to
understand the severity society attaches to this crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012)
(codifying that traitors “shall suffer death”).
28 HURST, supra note 27, at 132.
29 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), reprinted in PENN
STATE, Electronic Classics Series, The Federalist Papers (2001) (“As treason may be
committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be
enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great
engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have
usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with
great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional
definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining
the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond
the person of its author.”).
30 Compare, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 273 (“[G]uarantee of a jury trial
is a protection available if the designated individual decides to avail himself of it. With
regard to targeted killings, the Constitution, however, does not demand that a person
who is a military threat to the United States remain at large because he is good at
avoiding arrest.”), with Ramsey, supra note 24 at 869-70 (“Absent exigent
circumstances, the Constitution provides a specific way for acting against U.S.
citizens . . . [like al-Aulaqi]: the Treason Clause.”), and Larson, supra note 24 (arguing
that the Treason Clause provides for criminal process of how U.S. citizen-enemy
combatants should be treated).
25
26
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the Constitution discriminates between citizens and noncitizens who levy war against the United States31 by affording
citizens additional procedural protections beyond, and, as a
constitutional due process constraint, preceding32 what the Fifth
Amendment provides.33 Al-Aulaqi engaged in terrorist activities,
but he was also a citizen—a citizen-terrorist. 34 It is possible,
therefore, that his actions constituted treason. It is also possible
that his actions merely constituted speech protected by the First
Amendment, as it is curious how a supporter of George W.
Bush—who addressed a Pentagon luncheon for the Department
of Defense in February 2002—could become the global leader of
al Qaeda’s newest form by 2010.35 However, this note presumes
all facts favorable to the government, in an attempt to isolate
the issues of law from issues of fact.
Commentators have discussed the broad Treason Clause
claim generated by the unique circumstances of the al-Aulaqi
situation: the restrictive intent behind the Treason Clause
means it is constitutionally appropriate to treat citizenterrorists as traitors. 36 However, by broadly focusing on the
31 It is a settled matter of constitutional law that the Treason Clause applies
only persons owing allegiance, a category that includes every U.S. citizen and those
non-citizens who owe allegiance. See infra note 125.
32 Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (per curiam) (finding Article III
protections not “enlarge[d]” by additional amendments to the Constitution).
33 Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (providing specifically for the unique
requirement of two witnesses to the same overt acts as a procedural protection), with
id. at amend. V (providing for “due process” in all other crimes).
34 The use of “citizen-terrorist” throughout this note serves as shorthand for
U.S. citizens conducting politically or religiously motivated war against the United
States in connection with a terrorist organization. In the most convenient definition,
citizen-terrorists are the class of people affected by the al-Aulaqi case based on
factually similar positioning. See generally Richard H. Fallon, As-Applied and Facial
Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000); id. at 1368 (“asapplied challenges reflect entrenched though often unarticulated presuppositions that
the full meaning of a statute frequently is not obvious on the occasion of its first
application, but can be left to emerge through case-by-case specification . . . .”). Portions
of those notes may arguably apply to non-citizens owing allegiance, and indeed the
arguments that relate solely to the Treason Clause indubitably would. This note,
however, does not explore the effect of the Equal Protection Clause in the context a
non-citizen-terrorists owing allegiance.
35 JEREMY SCAHILL, DIRTY WARS: THE WORLD IS A BATTLEFIELD 36, 45 (Nation
Books, 2013). For a general description of the narrative were al-Aulaqi was hounded by the
government—unfairly and in violation of his rights—into finally fighting against his
country, see generally id. at chs. 2, 5, 18, 23, 33, 34, 37, 38, 44, 50, 55, 57.
36 Emily
C.
Kendall,
Guy
Fawkes’s
Dangerous
Remedy:
The
Unconstitutionality of Government-Ordered Assassination Against U.S. Citizens and Its
Implications For Due Process in America, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1136 (2012)
(arguing that “[the] Treason Clause is the constitutionally appropriate remedy for
bringing domestic terrorists to justice”); see also, e.g., Larson, supra note 24, at 863
(“The Article also argues that many terrorist actions are appropriately punished as
treason, either as acts of levying war against the United States or of adhering to their
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general restrictive intention, this scholarship overlooks the
more basic threshold question: is it even constitutionally
permissible for the Government to treat citizen-terrorists
differently than traitors?
Considering the al-Aulaqi killing in conjunction with a
reading of either the Treason Clause or, in most cases, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes
clear that the answer to this question is no. 37 The Supreme
Court has consistently held that the prosecution of criminals
without the procedural and substantive protections of the
Treason Clause under a crime that is substantively treason,
but differently named, is an unconstitutional prosecution for a
constructive treason offense.38 Similarly, in Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, the Supreme Court held that under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Government may not “lay[ ] an unequal hand” on criminals who
have committed “intrinsically the same . . . offense.”39 In that case,
the Court considered a lesser right than the right to life, the
right to reproduce.40
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 41 a plurality of the Supreme
Court addressed the liberty of Guantanamo detainees and held
that citizen-terrorists (even those termed enemy combatants in
the War on Terror) are entitled to due process. The actions
considered by the Supreme Court, if committed by citizens,
would be punishable as treason.42 Thus, there are twin perils
confronting any court adjudicating a modern terrorism case
where the defendant is a U.S. citizen. First, a court must avoid
the temptation to draw immaterial distinctions between the
constitutional definition of treason and modern statutes
enemies. Rather than representing a fundamental departure from the ordinary
criminal law paradigm, terrorist actions fit comfortably within it.”); Benjamin A. Lewis,
An Old Means To A Different End: The War On Terror, American Citizens . . . and the
Treason Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1215 (2006); Ramsey, supra note 24.
37 For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the Government
gave al-Aulaqi all process due under the law for similarly situated non-citizen terrorist
organization operatives. Those due process claims have been discussed by many
commentators, see supra note 24. This discussion is bracketing off those claims to focus on
other arguments that have not been given their due examination. The issue taken here is
not with treating terrorists in general this way, but treating in this way citizen-terrorists.
38 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (“[The Court does
not] . . . intimate that Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by
giving the same offense [treason] another name.”); see infra Part I.A (describing the
contours of this rule and its jurisprudential history in detail).
39 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Douglas, J.).
40 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
41 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion).
42 See infra Part III.C.
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criminalizing terrorism or else it risks ignoring the prohibition
against prosecuting constructive treasons. Then, it must take
care to avoid the second peril of ensuring that any differential
treatment of a citizen-terrorist and a traitor does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. Courts have yet to confront the
second peril because every court to consider the interplay
between the Treason Clause and citizen-terrorists to date has
faltered at the first peril. Therefore, and based on citizenship
alone, the execution of a U.S. citizen without judicial process—
even for committing terrorist acts—violates the prohibitions of
both the Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
In Part I, this note briefly summarizes jurisprudence
surrounding the two constitutional provisions relevant to the
issues raised by al-Aulaqi: the Treason Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause. Part II reviews the relevant facts of the alAulaqi case. Part III examines the elements of the crimes of
treason by levying war and terrorism, and establishes that
when committed by a citizen, treason by levying war and
terrorism are essentially the same offense with only immaterial
and legally inconsequential variances. In Part IV, this note
discusses the first peril of al-Aulaqi: that the law of treason
precludes the Government from charging citizens with terrorism
offenses that are not materially different from treason, yet fails
to provide the constitutional protections afforded to traitors.
Part V discusses the second peril: that denying citizenterrorists the same constitutional protections as traitors
violates the Equal Protection Clause 43 and would therefore
subject the Government’s actions in al-Aulaqi’s case to strict
scrutiny review.44 Finally, this note concludes that the Treason
Clause precludes the Executive from issuing kill orders against
citizen-terrorists without being processed by an Article III
court. It further suggests a specific remedy.

43
44

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
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1. The Treason Clause and the Rule Against
Constructive Treasons
American treason law borrows heavily from English
treason law, as evinced by the influence of the then-prevailing
English treason statute 45 upon the constitutional drafters. 46
Before the Statute of Edward III codified a restrictive definition
of treason, the English courts had the power to create what
James Madison called a “new-fangled and artificial treason[ ] .”47
Madison was referring to an English court’s power to invent a
constructive treason by expanding the common law definition
of treason to accommodate novel facts. 48 That is to say, the
courts had the power to declare acts treasonable that had never
been so before.49
Madison further described constructive treasons as “the
great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of
free government, have usually wreaked their alternate
malignity on each other.”50 In Revolutionary Era England, this
malignity typically took the form of public hanging, drawing,
and quartering. 51 Not surprisingly, the abusive use of
constructive treason became disfavored in England; and the
Statute of Edward III altered the law, codifying the definition
of treason and requiring that novel treason cases must go
before Parliament, instead of the courts.52
Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 67 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The most relevant source of materials for interpretation of the [T]reason [C]lause of
the Constitution is the statute of 25 Edw. III, Stat. 5, ch. 2 (1351) and the construction
which was given it.”); HURST, supra note 27 at 138-40; Larson, supra note 24, at 870
(“No provision of the Constitution is as rooted in English legal history as the Treason
Clause. It would likely surprise most Americans to learn that a portion of the United
States Constitution is taken almost verbatim from an English statute [25 Edw. 3 c. 2]
enacted when Geoffrey Chaucer was eight years old. The phrases ‘levying war’ and
‘adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort’ in the Treason Clause come
directly from the treason statute of 25 Edward III, enacted in 1351.”).
47 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 29; see also HURST, supra note 27, at 143.
48 HURST, supra note 27, at 139.
49 Id.
50 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 29.
51 Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2; United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88,
112 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *92).
52 HURST, supra note 27, at 139.
45
46
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While the Statute of Edward III was certainly an
improvement over the use of constructive treasons by a
handpicked judiciary serving at the pleasure of the King,53 the
Founding Fathers thought that this was not enough protection
for treason defendants. Mindful of their status as traitors while
fighting the rule of England, 54 they sought to eliminate the
potential for abusive prosecution of treason against groups
with public grievances by including systemic, constitutional
restrictions.55 First they created a fixed, restrictive definition of
treason by limiting it to the two offenses enumerated in the
Constitution—levying war and adhering to the enemy. 56
Second, they deliberately moved the Treason Clause to its final
position in Article III from its draft position in Article I so that
the Judiciary would “administer the clause” and Congress would
have no power with respect to the scope of the offense.57 Third,
they established an evidentiary requirement that two witnesses
testify to the same overt treasonous act, which further reflected
the “fundamentally restrictive attitude” behind the Drafters’
inclusion of the Clause. 58 Finally, regarding the scope of the
punishment, corruption of blood,59 the forfeiture of the convicted
traitor’s estate and disinheritance of successors, 60 were
prohibited entirely. In the broadest sense, the Drafters sought to
disable the Government from either amending the definition of
treason, or from punishing traitors without first satisfying a
high burden of proof.61

53 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 439 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “Curia Regis,” the
King’s court of appeals); see also Alford, supra note 24, at 1205-06, 1215.
54 United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (“[T]hey themselves were
traitors in the eyes of England.”), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908; N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
55 Rodriguez, 803 F.2d at 320 (“The reason for the restrictive definition is
apparent from the historical backdrop of the treason clause. The framers of the
Constitution were reluctant to facilitate such prosecutions because they were well
aware of abuses . . . .”).
56 The language in the Treason Clause intentionally reflects that of the
prevailing English treason statute, the Statute of Edward III, in order to limit the
definition of the crime to the “old terms.” HURST, supra note 27, at 131; see also Jon
Roland, Hurst’s Law of Treason, 35 UWLA L. REV. 297, 297-98 (2003).
57 HURST, supra note 27, at 139.
58 Id., at 132.
59 “[A] ‘corruption of blood’ is the perpetual forfeiture of the convicted person’s
estate to the disinheritance of his or her heirs or children.” See infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
60 See infra note 77.
61 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (requiring two witnesses to the same overt act);
HURST, supra note 27, at 130 (“At one stroke, the basis of the restrictive policy had
been laid: all authority is taken from any other agency to define the extent of the
crime . . . .”).
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Interpreting the Clause with an eye toward its
restrictive nature, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in Ex
parte Bollman that:
To prevent the possibility of those calamities . . . that great
fundamental law which defines and limits the various departments
of our government has given a rule on the subject both to the
legislature and the courts of America, which neither can be permitted
to transcend.
Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war
against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort.62

Accordingly, the Court created a doctrinal rule to reflect
the comprehensive yet precisely circumscribed treason
definition enshrined in the Constitution: from Bollman in 1807
to Cramer v. United States in 1947, the Court has consistently
held that treason may not be extended beyond its constitutional
definition.63 By virtue of this rule against constructive treasons,
merely immaterial variations in the elements of treason that
leave the gravamen of the offense intact will not create a
separate offense which avoids bringing the additional
procedural protections of the Treason Clause into play.64
2. Separation of Powers: The State’s Role in Crimes
against the State
Although the relocation of the Treason Clause from
Article I to Article III was intended to constrain the legislature,
“The treason clause[ ] [is] clearly [a] limitation[ ] upon all the
agencies of government, instead of . . . the legislative branch

62 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125-26 (1807) (emphasis added)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 3) (holding that conspiracy to levy war is a separate
offense from that of treason by levying war, and is not subject to the constitutional
restrictions of Article III); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
63 Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 127 (“[T]he crime of treason should not be
extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the
constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in its
wisdom may provide.”); see also id. at 118 (“The intention of having a constitutional
definition of the crime, was to put it out of the power of congress to invent treasons.”);
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (“[The Court does not] . . . intimate that
Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense
[treason] another name.”); HURST, supra note 27, at 239 (stating that the Drafters
“[A]cknowledg[ed] that the [T]reason [C]lause . . . set the exclusive definitions of
treason; Congress might not vary the elements of treason or escape the substantive
constitutional definition . . . by attaching a different label to [treason].”).
64 See supra note 63.
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only.” 65 Congress only has the power to prescribe a limited
punishment and has no power to redefine treason as such or to
expand that category of behavior that falls within the ambit of
“treason.” 66 The Judiciary is given the responsibility to
administer the law of treason, yet cannot expand the definition
of treason.67 The Executive has no express grant of responsibility
with respect to treason, but one may reasonably presume that
the President’s Article II “take care” powers68 would encompass,
for example, the incidental role of serving as prosecutor,
custodian, or executioner. The Constitution’s lack of any
express grant should be read as giving the President the least
authority in the administration of treason.69
Further, in Ex parte Garland, the Supreme Court read
the prohibition against corruptions of blood as a constitutional
charge to the Judiciary: “[T]herefore, to still further guard
against this odious form of punishment, it is provided, in
section three of article iii, concerning the judiciary [that
Congress may not work a corruption of blood] . . . .” 70 This
reading by the Court—that the placement of the Treason
Clause and its prohibition on corruptions of blood in Article III
charges the Judiciary to guard against its use—further bolsters
the conclusion that the placement of treason within Article III
textually commits the role of administering treason law to the
Judiciary.71 This reading of Article III as a separation of powers
regarding the administration of treason law was most recently

65

HURST, supra note 27, at 165; see also Alford, supra note 24, at 1215; infra

Part V.A.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
HURST, supra note 27, at 165.
68 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
69 See Alford, supra note 24, at 1215 (“The fact that the Constitution
prohibits bills of attainder and not royal proclamations of attainder (by then long
obsolete), should not be taken as evidence that the Framers endorsed the idea ex
silentio that the president should have the power of judging [citizens guilty of
treason]—especially since Hamilton felt that this would mean that there would be ‘no
liberty.’ This absence merely indicated that in 1787 this idea had already been
expressly rejected. By then it was the consensus position that the common law could
not countenance such an anti-constitutionalist idea, and the idea was hardly worth
mentioning.”); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of [ ] a . . . denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and . . . [another branch] may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain.”).
70 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 387 (1867) (Field, J.) (emphasis added).
71 See supra Part I.A.2.
66
67
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affirmed in the 2013 case New York Times Co. v. U.S.
Department of Justice.72
3. The Evidentiary Requirement and the Protection
against “Corruptions of Blood”
The Treason Clause contains a stringent, disjunctive
evidentiary requirement that is clear in its meaning—either
the Government must produce two witnesses to the same overt
act of treason, or the traitor must confess in open court.73 The
strict requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act is
unique to American treason jurisprudence.74 No federal defendant
has exercised the open confession option, but courts likely will
interpret it by its plain meaning.75
72 915 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and citing Larson, supra note 24 (internal citations
omitted)) (“Interestingly, the Treason Clause appears in the Article of the Constitution
concerning the Judiciary—not in Article 2, which defines the powers of the Executive
Branch. This suggests that the Founders contemplated that traitors would be dealt
with by the courts of law, not by unilateral action of the Executive. As no less a
constitutional authority than Justice Antonin Scalia noted, in his dissenting opinion in
Hamdi, ‘Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our
constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some
other crime.’”). For a discussion of how this separation of powers principle affects
Political Question Doctrine analysis, see infra Part IV.D.
73 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. Notably, nowhere in the text of the Treason
Clause is there a guarantee of trial and, in fact, such a blanket requirement may
seriously hinder the President’s ability to act in self-defense. The drafters did, however,
include an exhaustive enumeration of the specific procedural protections afforded to
traitors. Under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of construction, this
would mean that the Treason Clause then excludes the specific protection of a jury trial
for traitors. But see Ramsey, supra note 24, at 869-70 (citations omitted) (“The Treason
Clause requires that they be brought to trial under specific conditions . . . ”).
Conversely, under noscitur a sociis (it will be known by the company it keeps), the
drafters at the time were also likely cognizant of the immediately preceding text in
Article III, Section ii, providing that “The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.”
However, this right clearly would apply to treason for reasons discussed, infra, Part
V.A.2.a. For a thorough discussion of the right to a jury trial in a civilian jurisdiction
for traitors, see Larson, supra note 24. Larson argues very convincingly that “[u]nder
the constitutional law of treason, any person who is potentially subject to an American
treason prosecution must be tried in a civilian court and may not be detained by the
military as an enemy combatant or subjected to military tribunals.” Id. at 867.
74 Originally, in the 1695 Statute of William III, The Treason Act 1695, 7 & 8
Will. 3, c. 3., English law required that there be two witnesses to the crime of treason,
but not to the same overt act. The Founding Fathers, presumably finding this to be
insufficient, made the requirement stricter in American law. This particular
requirement has proven to be difficult for prosecutors. For example, in the trial of
Aaron Burr, Burr was acquitted based on the fact that there were no two witnesses to
the same overt act of treason by levying war. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 13-15
(Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14692a); United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 55, 181 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14693).
75 See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 426, 534 (2004) (“It is well established
that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least
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The Treason Clause also creates a unique protection for
property interests. A traitor’s assets may only be subjected to
temporary forfeiture, not perpetual forfeiture: “[N]o Attainder
of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except
during the Life of the Person attainted.” 76 In the context of
treason, a “corruption of blood” is the perpetual forfeiture of the
convicted person’s estate to the disinheritance of his or her
heirs or children. 77 Corruptions of blood were particularly
disfavored, both by the drafters of the Constitution 78 and in
England at the time that Blackstone wrote his Commentaries.79
Many state constitutions also showed an express disfavor for
corruptions of blood.80
During the Reconstruction Era, the Supreme Court
faced several challenges relating to disposition of
government-confiscated Confederate property. 81 In Wallach v.
Van Riswick, 82 the Court interpreted the 1862 Confiscation
Act. 83 The Court discussed the meaning of the Act and its
relation to the Article III bar on perpetual forfeitures: “[B]oth
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to
its terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485 (1917) (Day, J.) (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion.”); see also Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1,
39, 44, 60-61, 65-66 (1945) (giving dicta about the two-witness rule).
76 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
77 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 387 (1866); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “corruption of blood” as “[a] defunct
doctrine, now considered unconstitutional, under which a person loses the ability to
inherit or pass property as a result of an attainder . . . .”).
78 Max Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of
the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727, 730-31 (1992). The reasons for
the disfavor are clear: it harms innocent children. Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202,
210 (1876) (“What was intended by the constitutional provision [The Treason Clause] is
free from doubt. In England, attainders of treason worked corruption of blood and
perpetual forfeiture of the estate of the person attainted, to the disinherison of his
heirs, or of those who would otherwise be his heirs. Thus innocent children were made
to suffer because of the offence of their ancestor. When the Federal Constitution was
framed, this was felt to be a great hardship, and even rank injustice.” (emphasis
added)).
79 Stier, supra note 78, at 729-30; id. at 729 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *254).
80 See id. at 731-32 & nn. 35-36 (compiling an impressive list of similar state
prohibitions).
81 E.g., Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339, 343-46 (1869) (interpreting
the forfeiture clauses of the 1862 Confiscation Act).
82 92 U.S. 202 (1876), modifying Bigelow, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.).
83 An Act to Suppress Insurrection, To Punish Treason and Rebellion, To
Seize and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and For Other Purposes, 12 Stat. 589, 58992 (1863). Originally, the Act was interpreted in 1869 in Bigelow v. Forrest. 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) at 339. However, Van Riswick later refined the “incautious[ ] ” Bigelow language.
92 U.S. at 211.
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have the same meaning, and both seek to limit the extent of
forfeitures . . . . [a]nd there is no reason why one should receive
a construction different from that given to the other.” 84 The
Court held that, although it is constitutionally permissible to
subject a convicted traitor’s estate to complete divesture upon
conviction and to eliminate a traitor’s property interests,85 the
Government’s interest is limited to the natural life of the
traitor; at the cessation of which, the estate divests completely
from the Government and passes on to the decedent traitor’s
successors in interest.86
B.

The Equal Protection Clause and Skinner

In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Supreme
Court considered a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
challenge to a statute that mandated the forced sterilization of
one class of criminals—common thieves—but not embezzlers, a
class of criminals that committed essentially the same crime.87 The
Skinner Court left behind a very simple and powerful legacy
regarding equal protection under the law: “[W]hen the law lays an
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same
quality of offense . . . it has made as invidious a discrimination as if
it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment.” 88 By charging citizen-terrorist defendants under
terrorism statutes that impermissibly distinguish between the
criminal classes of traitors and terrorists, the government works a
constructive treason. Moreover, by not affording the additional
protections granted to defendants, the government disparately
impacts each defendant.

Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1876).
Id. at 211 (“The [Bigelow] language was, perhaps, incautiously used. We
certainly did not intend to hold that there was any thing left in the person whose estate
had been confiscated. The question was not before us. We were not called upon to
decide any thing respecting the quantity of the estate carved out; and what we said
upon the subject had reference solely to its duration.”).
86 Id. at 209.
87 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
88 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
84
85
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TINKER, TERRORIST, CITIZEN, TRAITOR: A STORY OF
ANWAR AL-AULAQI

Born in America89 to a Yemeni father,90 Anwar al-Aulaqi
was a dual American and Yemeni citizen at birth.91 Al-Aulaqi
lived in the United States until he was seven years old, when
his family returned to Yemen. 92 In 1991, he returned to the
United States, where he earned a bachelor’s degree at Colorado
State University, wed a Yemeni cousin, and later received a
master’s degree in Educational Leadership from San Diego
State University. 93 Al-Aulaqi permanently departed from the
United States in 2002. 94 He spent two years in the United
Kingdom before finally settling in Yemen in 2004.95 Al-Aulaqi
remained a U.S. citizen until he died.96
Before his departure from the United States, al-Aulaqi
was not a dangerous criminal. His U.S. criminal record
contains two charges in San Diego from 1996 and 1997, both
for soliciting prostitution. 97 The Government never indicted
89 Anwar al-Aulaqi was born April 21, 1971, in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Al-Awlaki:
Who Was He?, CNN (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/
30/al-awlaki-who-was-he/.
90 Nasser al-Aulaqi is a Yemeni National. Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra
note 13, at ¶ 9.
91 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012) (“[A] person born in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof [is a U.S. citizen] . . . .”); Yemeni Nationality Law,
Law No. (6) of 1990, art. III § (a), available at http://www.yemenembassy.org/
consulate/nationality.htm (granting citizenship by birth to those whose fathers are
Yemeni Nationals). Anwar al-Aulaqi’s father was a Yemeni National. Al-Aulaqi
Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 9.
92 Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet, From Condemning Terror to Preaching
Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A2. His father was a prominent Yemeni figure,
serving as chancellor of two universities and a government official. Id.
93 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; Kannof, supra note 24, at 1415-16.
“Peculiarly, despite his family’s relative wealth, al-Aulaqi falsely claimed that he was
born in Yemen, rather than the United States, in order to receive $20,000 in
scholarship money from a U.S. government program for which . . . (even as a dual
citizen), he should not have been eligible.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
94 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1416.
95 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; see also Kannof, supra note 24, at 1416.
96 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8; see also Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES
(July 18, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar_al_
awlaki/index.html.
97 Al-Awlaki:
Who Was He?, CNN (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:56 AM),
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/30/al-awlaki-who-was-he/. In 1999, the FBI took
notice of his role in an Islamic charity assumed to be funneling money to terrorists.
Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 92, at A2. He was questioned about his association
with Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhazmi, both of whom were 9/11 Hijackers. Id. The
FBI released him and no action was taken because they determined his contacts were
“random” and the “inevitable consequence of living in the small world of Islam in
America.” Id. The FBI did, however, consider invoking the Mann Act to prosecute alAulaqi, as he “had been observed crossing state lines with prostitutes in the D.C. area.”
Joseph Rhee & Mark Schone, How Anwar Awlaki Got Away, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30,
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him for any “terrorism-related crimes.”98 Al-Aulaqi transformed
into a traitor and a terrorist during his time in Yemen.99 While
al-Aulaqi was there, the United States grew increasingly
concerned and requested that the Yemeni authorities hold him
in custody. After his 18-month detainment in a Yemini prison
between 2006 and 2007 at the behest of U.S. authorities—
without trial—al-Aulaqi became a violent, active jihadist.100
In 2009, al-Aulaqi became a leader in AQAP, assuming
an operational role in the group and purportedly inspiring
more than a dozen terrorist plots with his clerical rhetoric.101
He provided “instructions” to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab for
his attempted bombing of a Christmas-day Northwest Airlines
flight;102 exchanged e-mails with Major Nidal Hasan, the U.S.
soldier who perpetrated the Fort Hood Massacre in 2009;103 and
influenced Faisal Shahzad, the attempted May 2010 Times
Square Bomber.104 Al-Aulaqi was accused of attempting to send
bombs via the U.S. mail in October 2010.105
Al-Aulaqi “made numerous public statements [as a
cleric and AQAP leader] calling for ‘jihad against the West,’
praising the actions of ‘his students’ Abdulmutallab and Hasan,
and asking others to ‘follow suit.’” 106 His public statements
included many YouTube videos that reached a wide, Englishspeaking audience. 107 Al-Aulaqi called for a holy war against
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/FtHoodInvestigation/anwar-awlaki/story?id=9200
720&page=1#.UIbJaLRW3Ek. An arrest warrant was issued for him on passport fraud
charges, but was later vacated. Id. In Yemen, he was held for eighteen months between
2006 and 2007 on kidnapping charges, but released without trial. Al-Awlaki: Who Was He?,
CNN (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/30/al-awlaki-who-washe/. He was charged and sentenced to ten years in absentia for “incitement to kill
foreigners,” relating to his material connection with the Fort Hood shooter and Christmas
Day Bomber. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; Al-Awlaki: Who Was He?, CNN (Sept. 30,
2011, 7:56 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/30/al-awlaki-who-was-he/.
98 Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 24.
99 Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 270 (concluding that “Al-Aulaqi was a traitor”
for the charge of levying of war and adhering to the enemies of the United States based
on his advocacy for, operative and managerial participation in, and recruitment on
behalf of the enemy organization AQAP); cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517, 519-20, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
100 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 92; see also supra note 97.
101 Designation of ANWAR AL-AULAQI Pursuant to Executive Order 13224
and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 4323301 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Al-Aulaqi Designation]; Kannof, supra note 24, at 1381.
102 Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101, at 43234.
103 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (citations omitted). The incident resulted
in 13 dead and 22 wounded. Kannof, supra note 24, at 1382.
104 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1382.
105 Id. at 1383.
106 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (citations omitted).
107 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1381.
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the United States, claiming that “‘America is evil . . . . [J]ihad
against America is binding upon myself just as it is binding on
every other Muslim . . . .’” 108 He also proclaimed “that he
‘[would] never surrender’ to the United States.”109
In classified proceedings, the CIA secretly approved alAulaqi as the target for a “lethal operation” in April 2010.110 AlAulaqi was termed a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by
the Treasury Department in July 2010. 111 In the summer of
2010, the CIA tried to eliminate al-Aulaqi through the creative
use of a Croatian video-order bride, a predator drone, and a
Danish double agent.112 Nasser al-Aulaqi, Anwar’s father, filed a
complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking to enjoin the lethal targeting of his son.113 On December
7, 2010, the matter was dismissed on a motion for summary
judgment for a lack of standing.114 After failing to kill al-Aulaqi
in a drone attack in May 2011,115 the United States ended his life
when, on September 30, 2011, a drone fired a “barrage of
Hellfire missiles” at his car.116 In July 2012, the ACLU re-filed
the case as al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, asserting standing based on
Nassar al-Aulaqi’s status as executor of his son’s estate.117

108 Paula Newton, Purported al-Awlaki Message Calls for Jihad Against U.S.,
CNN (Mar. 17, 2010) (quoting Anwar al-Aulaqi, YouTube Speech), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/WORLD/europe/03/17/al.awlaki.message/index.html.
109 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11 (citations omitted).
110 Greg Miller, Muslim Cleric Aulaqi Is 1st U.S. Citizen on List of Those CIA
Is Allowed to Kill, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html.
111 Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101, at 43233-34.
112 Paul Cruickshank et al., The Danish Agent, the Croatian Blonde and the
CIA Plot to Get al-Awlaki, CNN WORLD (Oct. 24, 2012, 8:54 pm), http://www.cnn.com/
2012/10/15/world/al-qaeda-cia-marriage-plot/index.html. In sum, the CIA used a
Danish double agent to arrange a marriage between al-Aulaqi and a blonde Croatian
devotee who interacted with him via video. Id. When al-Aulaqi and his fiancée were to
meet up, her luggage was to be bugged and then the CIA would send in a drone to kill
the entire party, likely with Hellfire missiles; however, her luggage was separated and
the plot failed. Brian Ross & Lee Ferran, Report: CIA Arranged Bride for Terrorist in
Plot to Kill Him, ABC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/report-ciaarranged-bride-terrorist-plot-kill/story?id=17437763#.UJShWml27-Y. The marriage,
however, was successful. Id. al-Aulaqi’s widow, after deciding against going on a
revenge suicide bombing, is currently an editor for the al-Qeada publication Inspire. Id.
113 See generally Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 6.
114 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 28, 30.
115 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3.
116 Id.
117 Panetta Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 6, 10, 41-3. Samir Kahn’s family
joined the lawsuit. Id.
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A.

Treason by Levying War: The Offense
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James Willard Hurst, author of the seminal treatise The
Law of Treason in the United States,118 defined treason through
levying war as the “direct effort to overthrow the government,
or wholly to supplant its authority in some part or all of its
territory.”119 The law of levying war has been subject to several
constructions that parse the law into three components: the
actus reus element, the mens rea element and attendant
allegiance requirement, and the geographic bounds. Levying war
requires that an assemblage of men make an overt act of force to
execute a treasonable design.120 The overt act requirement may
be met where the assembly itself is forceful.121
118 HURST, supra note 27. This work is considered the “classic legal treatise on
this constitutional topic.” Roland, supra note 56, at 297.
119 HURST, supra note 27, at 199.
120 Whether the force used is tantamount to levying war is a question of fact.
Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 118 (1807) (“[I]t [i]s impossible to define what
should in every case be deemed a levying of war. It is a question of fact to be decided by
the jury from all the circumstances.”). Fortunately, however, the sparse federal treason
jurisprudence can offer some direct and quite blunt light on the relationship between
acts of levying of war and terrorism. In deciding the fate of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombers, the Second Circuit held in Rahman, that terrorist acts (factually
analogous to those al-Aulaqi was engaged in) are “ample evidence . . . [of] levy[ing]
war.” 189 F.3d 88, 149-61 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see id. at 149-60 (affirming that
facts such as calling for jihad and participating in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing were sufficient evidence for sustaining a conviction of seditious conspiracy to
levy war and that the sentencing guidelines for treason by levying war were the “most
analogous.”); accord United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012); United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987).
121 Originally, Chief Justice Marshall defined the actus reus of treason by
levying of war as “an assemblage of persons for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable purpose.” Bollman, 8 U.S (4 Cranch) at 75 (Marshall, C.J.). He later
clarified this part of his Bollman opinion, holding that an assembly is a precondition
for the overt acts and, if the assembly is in force, then it will constitute the overt act
itself. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 13 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va.,
1807) (No. 14692a) (discussing the meaning of the Supreme Court in Bollman); see also
Opinion on The Motion To Introduce Certain Evidence in the Trial of Aaron Burr, For
Treason, United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 455, 487 (1807) (Marshall, Circuit
Justice) (“[A]n assemblage of men which should constitute the fact of levying war, must
be an assemblage in force [as Chief Justice Marshall understands his opinion in
Bollman]. . . .”). The likely reason for this distinction is that peaceable assemblies also
exist. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Justice Story’s later interpretation of the actus reus of
treason in 1842 upholds this distinction. In re Charge to Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F.
Cas. 1046, 1047 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C. D.R.I. 1842) (“To constitute an actual levy
of war, there must be an assembly of persons, met for the treasonable purpose, and
some overt act done, or some attempt made by them [the assembly] with force to
execute, or towards executing, that purpose.”).
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The assemblage portion of the actus reus element
requires that there be more than one participant assembled to
levy war because, historically, levying war alone would have
been factually impossible—a single person was “not in a
condition to levy war.” 122 Although this assumption has been
questioned in the wake of technological advances in the
destructive potential of modern weapons, 123 an assemblage
remains an element of treason.
Turning to the mens rea element: “The character of the
intention . . . rather than any difference in the overt acts,
marks the line between riot and treason by levying war.”124 The
mens rea element has two prongs: first, one must betray an
owed allegiance to the United States; second, the actor must
have a treasonable, or public, purpose or intent. The first prong
requires a pre-existing allegiance; there can be no betrayal
without an initial allegiance. 125 Further, to betray, one must
intend “to benefit the enemy’s war effort and to harm that of
the United States.”126 An intent to betray may be inferred by
presuming the actor intended the natural consequences of his
or her actions.127 The treasonable design or purpose prong can
be established through the demonstration that an alleged
traitor had a non-private motive to disrupt Government
administration of laws, or to coerce or change its policy.128 Holy
war likely is not a private motivation.129
122 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 169 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
Va., 1807) (No. 14693).
123 Larson, supra note 24, at 913-14 (“[S]uch a person can be said to levy war
against the United States; it would strain all credulity to assert, for example, that
there must be at least two people in the cockpit of the plane in order for war to be
levied.”).
124 HURST, supra note 27, at 200.
125 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1944); accord Augustin, 661 F.3d
1105; Rahman, 189 F.3d 88; Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318; HURST, supra note 27, at 193.
126 HURST, supra note 27, at 244.
127 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 32 (“Since intent must be inferred from conduct of
some sort, we think it is permissible to draw usual reasonable inferences as to
intent . . . . The law of treason . . . assumes every man to intend the natural
consequences which one standing in his circumstances and possessing his knowledge
would reasonably expect to result from his acts.”).
128 In re Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (Story,
Circuit Justice, C.C. D.R.I. 1842); United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105, 115 (C.C.
E.D. Pa. 1851).
129 See John Brown’s Speech to the Court at His Trial, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB.
POL’Y RESEARCH, http://www.nationalcenter.org/JohnBrown%27sSpeech.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013) (internal citations omitted) (“[The Bible] [t]hat teaches me that
all things whatsoever I would that men should do to me, I should do even so to them. It
teaches me, further, to remember them that are in bonds, as bound with them. I
endeavored to act up to that instruction. I say I am yet too young to understand that
God is any respecter of persons. I believe that to have interfered as I have done—as I
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Regarding geography, courts have consistently held that
treason may be committed anywhere by anyone who owes
allegiance to the United States.130 That is to say, there is no
place where acts constituting treason would be immunized
from prosecution.
B.

The Crime of Terrorism in the Era of the War on Terror

Terrorism is defined in a variety of U.S. statutes. 131
Many of these laws contain nearly identical text.132 This note
will consider two definitions of terrorism: the most popular
one,133 the FISA definition, and the definition of the “Federal
crime of terrorism.”134
The FISA definition contains three elements: an actus
reus, a violent crime that is a violation of the laws of the
United States or its individual states;135 the proper mens rea,
an intent to “influence the policy of a government by
have always freely admitted I have done—in behalf of His despised poor was not
wrong, but right. Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the
furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my
children and with the blood of millions in this slave country whose rights are
disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments—I submit; so let it be done!”).
Despite his religious motivations, John Brown was executed for treason against the
State of Virginia. Id.
130 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1952) (citing Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126 (1807)).
131 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012) (defining the “Federal crime of
terrorism”); see also Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of
Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 255 & n.48 (2004) (listing
the statutes).
132 Compare,
e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2011) (defining “international
terrorism”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (defining “international terrorism” with a slightly
different jurisdictional element in subsection (C) than the one at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(c)(3)). For a thorough discussion of the prevalence of this language in terrorism
definitions, see Perry, supra note 131, at 256-57.
133 Perry, supra note 131, at 256.
134 The statute reads in relevant part:
(5) the term “Federal crime of terrorism” means an offense that—
(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and
(B) is a violation of—
(i) . . . [relating to various violent crimes]
(ii) . . . [relating to atomic weapons crime]
(iii) . . . [relating to various aircraft crimes]
(iv) . . . [relating to narco-terrorism].
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).
135 Id. § 1801(c)(1).
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intimidation or coercion”;136 and the requirement that the act
occurs “outside the United States, or transcend[s] national
boundaries.”137 The federal crime definition has two elements:
an actus reus, a violent crime; and the mens rea requirement
that the act be “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct.”138
C.

The Same Offense: Treason By Levying War and
Terrorism

Although Equal Protection Clause and Treason Clause
decisions use different language—”intrinsically the same quality
of offense”139 and immaterially varying the substance of treason,140
respectively—both sets of language mean that analysis under
either is triggered if the two offenses are substantively the same.
Comparing the actus reus of treason by levying war and
that of the two terrorism definitions, there is obvious
commonality. Both require some sort of violent act or force.141
Although the FISA definition stands apart in requiring that
the act be criminal, this distinction does not create a material
difference between the definitions of treason by levying war
and terrorism. Most violent acts are criminal; or, more
specifically, any act that is tantamount to terrorism would be
tantamount to levying war. Therefore, FISA’s additional
requirement does not narrow the scope of acts that fall within
the definition of terrorism.
Comparing the mens rea element—the most important
element 142 —it becomes even clearer that the crimes are
substantively indistinguishable. Treason by levying war
requires the intent to coerce or force change in government
policy, or to usurp government power in all or part of its
territory. 143 FISA’s terrorism definition requires the intent to

Id. § 1801(c)(2)(B).
Id. § 1801(c)(3).
138 Id. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)–(B).
139 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
140 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
141 Compare Part III.A (discussing the actus reus of treason by levying war,
the violent force of levying war), with Part III.B. (discussing the elements of terrorism,
including the actus reus of force).
142 HURST, supra note 27, at 200.
143 Id. at 199; see also In re Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. at
1047 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C. D.R.I. 1842); United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas.
105, 115 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1851).
136
137
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influence or to coerce the policy of government by force.144 The
“Federal crime” definition of terrorism requires that the act “is
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion . . . .”145 The FISA definition’s failure to
specify the U.S. government is of no consequence as applied to
citizen-terrorists—in this case persons conducting jihad against
the United States in the ongoing War on Terror. Thus, in the
context at issue, there is no material difference between the
mens rea requirements of treason and terrorism.
There is no basis for distinction between the two crimes
with respect to the elements, or lack of elements, regarding
geography, assemblage, and allegiance. First, the geographical
limitation in the FISA definition does not, by itself, make that
offense materially different from treason because treason may
be committed anywhere. Therefore, the potential geographic
range of the two crimes overlap such that all FISA terrorism is
treason but not all treason is FISA terrorism.146 Further, the
argument that geographic limitations by themselves create
substantively different offenses leads to absurd conclusions.147
Imagine if Congress were to create two crimes, A and B,
which, with the exception of adding geographic limits, mirror
the crime of treason by levying war. Crime A only punishes
acts performed within the boundaries of the United States;
crime B only punishes acts performed outside of the boundaries
of the United States. The Government would never need to
indict any citizen for treason to punish treasonous acts,
because in all cases it could achieve the same result by
prosecuting the citizen under either crime A or B. Therefore, the
government would not be constrained by the administratively
cumbersome evidentiary and substantive protections afforded to
the accused at a treason trial because any instance of treason
could be punished under either A or B. That is to say, by
dividing the world into whatever arbitrary components it found
desirable, Congress could dodge the restrictive definitions of
the Treason Clause. This is precisely the result that the
Framers sought to avoid in drafting the Treason Clause; the
Constitution will not allow the introduction of a geographical
§ 1801(c)(2)(B).
§ 2332b(g)(5)(A).
146 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1952). In Kawakita, the
Court held that an American-Japanese dual citizen owed allegiance to the United
States even while domiciled in Japan during World War II and thus, his acts in Japan
were treason. Id.; see also Carlisle v. United States (The Carlisle Case), 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 147, 154-55 (1873).
147 See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
144
145
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limitation to create a crime distinct from treason. When a
citizen commits an act of terrorism, geographical limitations in
the definition of terrorism cannot form a basis for
differentiating it from treason when they are substantively the
same in all other material aspects.
Second, although the traditional notion of treason
requires an assemblage, there are three reasons why this
unique facet does not intrinsically distinguish treason from
terrorism in the context of al-Aulaqi. First, although one
person may commit terrorism and only an assemblage may
levy war, as applied to a citizen-terrorist conducting jihad
against the United States in tandem with a terrorist
organization, that terrorist has clearly assembled in force. The
same reasoning would apply to any such citizen-terrorist, so the
express requirement in treason of multiple persons would be a
distinction without a difference. For example, in making the
decision to issue a kill order against al-Aulaqi, the President
took specific note of al-Aulaqi’s operational role in AQAP, a
group that is easily described as an enemy assemblage of
persons levying war against the United States. 148 This fact
permits the inference that al-Aulaqi’s association with an
assemblage of men levying war against the United States
informed the decision to target him for death. Second, the
assemblage element is outdated and outmoded, reflecting a
court determination that one man levying war is a factual
impossibility—modern terrorists have shown that is no longer
an impossibility.149 Therefore, the assemblage element creates
no distinction in War on Terror cases such as al-Aulaqi’s, and
the common-law inclusion of the element could not survive
review on its merits.
Third, although treason requires a betrayal of a preexisting allegiance to the United States, this distinction from
terrorism is similarly immaterial within the context of alAulaqi. By definition, a citizen owes allegiance to his or her
148 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (quoting President Barack Obama) (“‘The
death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate . . . [alAulaqi took] the lead role in planning and directing the efforts to murder innocent
Americans.’”).
149 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108458, 118 Stat. 3637 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)) (the FISA “lone wolf”
terrorist provision); Larson, supra note 24, at 913-14 (“[S]uch a person can be said to
levy war against the United States; it would strain all credulity to assert, for example,
that there must be at least two people in the cockpit of the plane in order for war to be
levied.”); see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Larson and
assemblage); infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing Larson and
assemblage).
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country.150 Owing an allegiance to the United States is a factual
precondition for the commission of treason. 151 Further, as a
matter of construction, the omission of an express allegiance
requirement does not in any degree affect the analysis of a
court construing a statute for similarity to treason. 152 For
example, a person owing allegiance only to Russia could not be
charged with treason against the United States even if the U.S.
treason statute at issue lacked an allegiance element. While
comparing the treason and misprision of treason statutes,
Chief Justice Marshall observed in United States v. Wiltberger:
The 1st section defines the crime of treason, and declares, that if any
person or persons owing allegiance to the United States of America
shall levy war,” & c. “such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty
of treason,” & c. The second section defines misprision of treason;
and in the description of the persons who may commit it, omits the
words “owing allegiance to the United States,” and uses without
limitation, the general terms “any person or persons.” Yet, it has
been said, these general terms were obviously intended to be limited,
and must be limited, by the words “owing allegiance to the United
States,” which are used in the preceding section.
It is admitted, that the general terms of the 2d section must be so
limited; but it is not admitted, that the inference drawn from this
circumstance, in favour of incorporating the words of one section of
this act into another, is a fair one. Treason is a breach of allegiance,
and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance either
perpetual or temporary. The words . . . “owing allegiance to the
United States,” in the first section, are entirely surplus words, which
do not, in the slightest degree, affect its sense. The construction
would be precisely the same were they omitted. When, therefore, we
give the same construction to the second section, we do not carry those
words into it, but construe it as it would be construed independent of
the first. There is, too, in a penal statute, a difference between
restraining general words, and enlarging particular words.153

Thus, in light of Wiltberger, the omission of an
allegiance requirement from the terrorism definitions is a
distinction from treason without a difference.
By definition, as a citizen, al-Aulaqi owed allegiance to
the United States. His operational involvement in a professed
holy war against the United States while maintaining
150 Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 721-23 (holding that citizens owe allegiance
regardless of where they are domiciled). This allegiance is owed even if the individual
holds a dual citizenship. Id.
151 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820).
152 Id.
153 Id. (interpreting the treason statute, which is now codified at 18 U.S.C
§ 2381).
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citizenship permits the inference that he intended to betray
that allegiance by acts tantamount to levying war. Al-Aulaqi’s
conduct that led to his killing involved citizens operating with
terrorist organizations: he influenced and encouraged others,
which is action taken in tandem with an assembly. Further,
terrorist acts analogous to those in which al-Aulaqi was
engaged 154 have been described as “ample evidence . . . [of]
levy[ing] war” by the Second Circuit and similarly by its sister
Circuits.155 Therefore, al-Aulaqi was both a traitor and a terrorist.
IV.

THE FIRST PERIL: THE TREASON CLAUSE

The Supreme Court has held for over 150 years that
creating merely artificial distinctions between treason and
another crime may not circumvent the Treason Clause’s specific
protections. 156 Because the crimes of treason and terrorism
(when
committed
by
a
citizen)
are
essentially
indistinguishable, either the punishment of citizens for
terrorism or the adjudication of them as a terrorist should
invoke Treason Clause protections 157 by virtue of the rule
against constructive treasons. This part discusses applications
of the rule against constructive treasons and how it applies to
al-Aulaqi’s case. This section concludes that the rule against
constructive treasons is violated in the case where the
defendant is a citizen-terrorist charged with terrorism offenses.

154 See supra Part II (calling for jihad against the United States, encouraging
terrorism, and planning and assisting in the operations of a terrorist organization that
has claimed responsibility for attacking the United States); see also Dreyfuss, supra
note 24, at 269-70 (stating that al-Aulaqi had levied war).
155 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 149-61 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(affirming that facts such as calling for jihad and participating in the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing were sufficient evidence for sustaining a conviction of seditious
conspiracy to levy war and that the sentencing guidelines for treason by levying war
were the “most analogous.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000); accord United States v.
Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012); United
States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987); see
also supra note 120.
156 See supra note 63.
157 These exceptions include, e.g., the two-witness evidentiary requirement
and the prohibition on corruptions of blood, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, all due criminal
procedural rights, and the right to trial by jury. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
117, 119-20 (1970). The Bollman opinion also notes that the bench-warrant issued
against Aaron Burr was illegal because a grand jury had not been presented with the
matter, and the offense was not committed in the presence of the court. 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 113-14 (1807). For a discussion of the right to a jury trial in treason cases,
see infra Part V.A.2.a.
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The Rule Against Constructive Treasons Revisited

The rule against constructive treasons must be applied
to al-Aulaqi’s case, as terrorism and treason are essentially the
same offense. 158 Unfortunately, the lack of treason cases 159
leaves very few applications of the rule against constructive
treasons. The resulting doctrinal underdevelopment and courts’
use of loose and amorphous terms, such as “vary[ ] ” 160 to
describe alterations to treason has created interpretive
problems. This looseness in language has led to at least one
drastic misapplication of the rule in Supreme Court precedent
and several questionable Circuit decisions. 161 The resulting
doctrinal ambiguity has eviscerated the constructive treason
defense, the assertion by defendants that their prosecution
under a particular crime is a prohibited constructive treason
prosecution. This section discusses the contours of the rule, its
misapplication by the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, and
provides a reading that harmonizes Supreme Court precedent,
while providing a solid precedential basis for reversing the
Circuits and restoring the defense against constructive treason.
1. Three Formulations of the Rule
Upon close reading and as identified in this note for the
first time, Supreme Court precedent reveals that three
particular methods of manipulating the treason definition are
prohibited under the rule against constructive treasons. Taken
in tandem, these forms of the rule provide a cohesive
framework for analyzing any variance from or manipulation of
the definition of treason. The rule against constructive treasons
may thus be formulated in three different ways, termed
mirroring, additive, and subtractive.
The mirroring formulation of the rule prohibits
Congress from creating a constructive treason by mirroring the
elements of treason and merely changing the name of the crime.
Under the Constitution, treason by any other name remains

See supra Part III.C.
HURST, supra note 27, at 187 (“There have been less than two score treason
prosecutions pressed to trial by the Federal government.”).
160 Id. at 239.
161 See infra Part IV.A.3.
158
159
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treason, subject to Article III restrictions and protections.162 The
Court expressly adopted this formulation in Cramer.163
Under the additive formulation of the rule, Congress
may not create a constructive treason by inventing a new crime
that would otherwise be treason but for the addition of
immaterial elements. For example, Congress could not pass a
statute that mirrors treason but for an additional element that
the overt act must be done while wearing a red hat. That law
would only alter treason by an immaterial element.164 Adding
immaterial requirements to treason and thus merely relabeling
it creates a constructive treason. In Bollman, the Court held
that the addition of a conspiracy element creates a crime
materially distinct from treason itself, and thus, because the
addition makes the crime substantively distinguishable,
conspiracy to commit treason by levying war does not carry
Article III protection.165 The Bollman opinion thus shows that
the addition of a materially different element—the actus reus
of agreement rather than a violent act—creates a separate
crime from treason.166
The subtractive formulation of the rule is somewhat
more nuanced than the others. Congress may not codify an
offense that provides for harsher punishment than that
permitted by Article III, but in its description merely subtracts
an element of treason and, as applied to a particular defendant,
162 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (“[The Court does
not] . . . intimate that Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by
giving the same offense [treason] another name.”).
163 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45.
164 For an example of a statute that is materially different enough from treason by
levying war to avoid this rule, see the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
165 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126-28 (1807) (“To conspire to
levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offences . . . it has been determined that
the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to
levying war . . . . [T]he crime of treason should not be extended by construction to
doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition, should
receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide . . . a
combination or conspiracy to levy war against the United States is not treason, unless
combined with an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into execution; some
actual force or violence must be used in pursuance of such design to levy war . . . .”); cf.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). While the reasoning is discussed infra, Part IV.A.3,
Quirin actually is an example of the Court applying this sort of reasoning.
166 This reading of Bollman is subject to the alternative reading that there is
both an addition and a subtraction to the crime of conspiracy to levy war crime: the
addition of an overt act of agreement and the subtraction of force requirement.
However, this is a nominal distinction. If the subtraction itself were the material
difference, the crime would have been subject to the subtractive formulation below,
yielding a different result. The addition of the different actus reus created a separately
cognizable offense in all cases. The formulations may operate in conjunction and the
aim is to find material distinction.
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would be treason.167 As the Supreme Court held in Wiltberger, a
citizen may not constitutionally be punished under a
congressionally created statute that mirrors treason but omits
the allegiance requirement and provides for process inconsistent
with Article III protections.168 Because, by default, a citizen owes
an allegiance to the country, the actions for which that citizen is
to be punished would be indistinguishable from treason. To
permit such a manipulation would eviscerate the Treason
Clause of any meaning. This formulation is more limited than
the other two. The subtractive formulation only invalidates a
statute as applied to circumstances where all the elements of
treason are satisfied—it can never render a statute facially
invalid. Although the hypothetical statute is perfectly valid as
applied to those who do not owe allegiance, it would constitute
a constructive treason if applied to a citizen. This formulation
is more of a cannon of construction, where, as applied, a statute
must be construed to avoid creating a constructive treason.
In light of these formulations, the rule against
constructive treasons may seem expansive at first impression.
But there is a limiting principle: the gravamen of the offense
must be materially the same as that of treason, and the conviction
must not have been in accord with Treason Clause protections.169
Thus, the crime alleged to be a constructive treason must punish
“a direct effort to overthrow the government [by one owing
allegiance], or wholly to supplant its authority in some part or all
of its territory” 170 for a non-private motive. 171 For example, an
offence criminalizing a direct effort to overthrow the Government
or to supplant its authority for solely private motives is not a
constructive treason, but more properly construed as espionage
because of the lack of a public motivation.172
Although the rule against constructive treasons
prohibits the use of a law that immaterially varies from treason
to punish a citizen, a citizen may be punished under a statute
that, although overlapping in elements, materially differs from
See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820) (Marshall,
C.J.); see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
169 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 127 (1807) (“[T]he crime of
treason should not be extended by construction . . . . [C]rimes not clearly within the
constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature . . . may
provide.”); see also supra note 63.
170 HURST, supra note 27, at 186, 199.
171 Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. at 1047.
172 See HURST, supra note 27, at 239-40 (discussing the Rosenberg case that
was before the Second Circuit. 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952)).
167
168
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treason.173 If any single difference is material, then the crime is
substantively distinguishable from treason, and the offense is not
subject to the restrictions of the Treason Clause.174
2. The Three Formulations Applied
An application of the three formulations of the rule
against constructive treasons reveals that neither the FISA nor
the Federal crime definition of terrorism may be constitutionally
applied to citizens. Both the FISA and Federal crime definitions
of terrorism punish the same actus reus and mens rea as
treason.175 Because both definitions of terrorism omit treason’s
allegiance requirement and the FISA definition imports a
geographical limitation,176 the mirroring formulation of the rule
against constructive treasons is not implicated.177 However, the
omission of the allegiance and assemblage requirements from
both definitions implicates the subtractive formulation of the
rule, and the geographic limitation within the FISA definition
implicates the additive formulation.
As discussed above in Part IV.A.1, the omission of an
allegiance element is immaterial because, when applied to a
citizen, there is no material difference between acts that could be
prosecuted as treason, and those that could be prosecuted as
terrorism.178 Further, in Wiltberger, the Supreme Court expressly
stated that the omission of an allegiance element does not affect
the construction of treason when comparing the requirements
of the treason statute to the requirements of other laws.179
The omission of an assemblage element is likewise
immaterial when the terrorism definitions are applied to alAulaqi’s conduct. First, in al-Aulaqi’s case, his role as “leader of
external operations” in AQAP 180 requires an assemblage.
Second, as applied to any citizen who is conducting jihad
against America in connection with a terrorist organization,
the shared jihad of the movement constitutes an “assemblage

See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 126-27.
See id. at 127.
175 See supra Part III.C.
176 See supra Part III.C.
177 See supra Part I.
178 See supra Part IV.A.1.
179 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.).
180 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (“‘The death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al
Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate . . . [al-Aulaqi took] the lead role in planning
and directing the efforts to murder innocent Americans.’”).
173
174
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in force.”181 Third, the circumstances that underpinned Marshall
reading an assemblage requirement into the definition of
treason have unraveled in the wake of advances in modern
weapons technology.182
The imposition of a geographical limitation on the act of
terrorism cannot, under the additive formulation, create a crime
distinct from treason. If the acts are committed by a citizen, as
discussed above, such a holding leads to absurd conclusions. The
Court may not permit the arbitrary geographic petitioning of
treason to create a distinction from terrorism where none exists.183
It would be absurd to claim, for example, that Benedict Arnold
would be an international terrorist under the FISA definition
and not a traitor if all of his treacherous acts took place in Britain,
rather than West Point.184 Or, more narrowly, that he might not
be afforded Treason Clause protections under the Constitution
because of the geographical distinction.
So what is the effect of this analysis in al-Aulaqi’s case?
The rule against constructive treasons would apply to all state
181 Opinion on The Motion To Introduce Certain Evidence in the Trial of
Aaron Burr, For Treason, United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 455, 487 (1807)
(Marshall, Circuit Justice) (Fed. Cas. Number 14692a); see also supra note 121.
182 The Supreme Court has recognized before that a change in technology or
other circumstance may render irrelevant a previous understanding of a constitutional
provision. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court noted:

West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of
facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the
earlier constitutional resolutions. Each case was comprehensible as the
Court’s response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to
understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its own
declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive . . . . In constitutional
adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new
obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision
to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty.
505 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1992). In the context of treason, Larson’s argument that the
advances in weaponry since the Marshall Court have altered the military landscape,
see supra notes 123, 149 and accompanying text, make a compelling case for a similar
change in the law of treason with respect to the necessity of an assemblage.
183 This point was previously made through a reductio ad absurdum form of
argument, see supra Part III.C (giving a longer and logically precise reductio ad
absurdum form of argument on this point). To briefly illustrate the point by way of
literary example: in Green Eggs and Ham, Dr. Seuss, through the protagonist,
attempts to make an exhaustive list of the places in which the protagonist refused to
breakfast: “I would not eat them here or there. I would not eat them anywhere.” DR.
SEUSS, GREEN EGGS AND HAM 24 (1960). However, his refusal to eat them either here
or there is clearly subsumed within his refusal to eat them anywhere. Similarly, an act
of terrorism committed by a citizen, either here or there, is clearly subsumed by the
definition of an act of treason committed anywhere. See Kawakita v. United States, 343
U.S. 717 (1952) (holding that treason may be committed anywhere).
184 See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1952) (holding that a
treasonous act may be committed by a citizen extraterritorially).
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actions, 185 including those of the CIA—an agency within the
executive branch—and the Executive. Thus, although the
determination to place al-Aulaqi on a kill list was made by the
CIA and not the Judiciary, the same rule against constructive
treasons constrains the CIA’s ability to draw immaterial
distinctions between treason and another crime in deciding to
kill al-Aulaqi without Article III process.
3. The Problematic Case of Ex parte Quirin
The rule against constructive treasons has been called into
question by commentators 186 based on dicta in a controversial
1942 Supreme Court case, Ex parte Quirin. 187 However, these
commentators fundamentally misread the dicta from that case.
a. The Quirin Problem: Herbert Haupt, Nazi Saboteur
and U.S. Citizen
U.S. citizen Herbert Haupt and six other Nazis sought a
writ of habeas corpus to avoid trial under military jurisdiction.188
Haupt and his crew were caught by the FBI after they landed by
submarine in Florida and arrived in New York City dressed as
civilians.189 The Quirin Court addressed whether a U.S. citizen
acting as a Nazi saboteur could lawfully be tried for unlawful
belligerency—a crime under the “Hague Convention and the law
of war” incorporated by an Act of Congress—rather than
treason. 190 The Court held that an additional requirement—
185 HURST, supra note 27, at 165 (“[T]he treason clause[ ] [is] clearly [a] limitation[
] upon all the agencies of government, instead of . . . the legislative branch only.”).
186 Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900; James Willard Hurst, Treason in the
United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 395, 421 (1945) (“On the other hand, where the
defendant is charged with conduct involving all the elements of treason within the
constitutional definition, and the gravamen of the accusation against him is an effort to
subvert the government, or aid its enemies, it would seem in disregard of the policy of the
Constitution to permit him to be tried under another charge than ‘treason.’ However, the
decision in Ex parte Quirin casts considerable doubt on the validity of this analysis.”),
rpt’d in HURST, supra note 27 at 147; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
187 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19, aff ’ g 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (finding
that a writ of habeas corpus may not issue for Quirin and six others), aff ’ d on other
grounds, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516, 548-49 (2004) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added) (affirming the general ability of the Government to treat enemy
belligerents as such in a “foreign theater of war”; however, not affirming the
interpretation that Quirin allows for no limitation on the Government power based on
citizenship: “Ex parte Quirin . . . may perhaps be claimed for the proposition that the
American citizenship of such a captive does not as such limit the Government’s power
to deal with him under the usages of war.”).
188 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
189 Id. at 18-19.
190 Id. at 37-8.
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that the actor not be wearing a military uniform—
differentiated unlawful belligerency from treason. This
distinction arguably called into question the rule against
constructive treasons. 191 No doubt because of the seemingly
obvious immateriality of the addition of the no-uniform
requirement to what would otherwise be treason.192
Commentators have asserted that Quirin is contrary to
the rule against constructive treasons. 193 Because Quirin
permitted Congress to enact a crime that added presumably
immaterial elements to the crime of treason, it does appear to
be a departure from the Court’s longstanding adherence to the
rule against constructive treasons. However, instead of casting
doubt on the rule itself, Quirin merely represents a
questionable application of the rule, to which commentators
have ascribed too much weight. This is especially true in light
of its narrow applicability194 and the availability of a reading of
Quirin that does not negate the rule.
There are five convincing reasons why Quirin should
not be construed as contrary to the rule against constructive
treasons and why, instead, it should be limited to its facts.
First, Quirin’s language regarding treason is merely “dict[a]” 195
as no treason charge was before the Court. It is well-settled that
the Court “will not bind [itself] unnecessarily to passing dict[a].”196
Second, Quirin is a wartime case. As Court precedent from this
era, a “time of war and of grave public danger,” 197 shows,
wartime cases often make bad law.198 The Court at that time
was known for giving significant latitude to the Government
during war that may not be acceptable boundaries of conduct
today. 199 Third, the Quirin dicta has received decidedly
Id. at 38.
Id. (addition of a uniform is “irrelevant” to treason).
193 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (per curiam) (1999) (stating
that the Quirin “dictum” suggests that “citizens could be tried for an offense against
the law of war that included all the elements of treason.”); HURST, supra note 27, at
147; Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900 (stating that Hamdi repeats the error of Ex
parte Quirin in eviscerating the Treason Clause of meaning).
194 Besides the analysis that follows, there is some jurisprudential basis for
reading Quirin as narrowly holding that the Government has a right to exercise
military jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen in certain circumstances. See N.Y. Times Co. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 526 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); cf. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569-72 & n.4 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 113 (comparing Ex parte Quirin with Cramer).
196 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
197 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
198 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally
Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945)).
199 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 715 & n.45 and accompanying text (4th ed. 2011) (citing Rostow, supra note
191
192
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negative reviews from both well-regarded commentators200 and
Supreme Court Justices. 201 Fourth, Herbert Haupt’s “mission
was to act as a secret agent, spy[,] and saboteur for the German
Reich.” These sorts of overt acts are relegated to the realm of
adhering to the enemy by giving aid and comfort, not the
levying of war.202 Fifth, Quirin’s reliance on the powers of the
President under the usages of war was severely limited by the
1957 decision, Reid v. Covert. Covert causes a crime under the
“Hague Convention and the law of war” and incorporated by an
Act of Congress to subordinate to the requirements of the
Constitution generally, and thus, of import to this note, the
Treason Clause.203
Even assuming the Quirin dicta stood as good law, a close
reading does support a negation of the rule against constructive
treasons. The language at issue in Quirin is a very terse
treatment of the issue of treason versus unlawful belligerency:
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this
country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the
meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. It is as an
enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the
United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the
offense of which he is accused.
The argument leaves out of account the nature of the offense which
the Government charges and which the Act of Congress, by
incorporating the law of war, punishes. It is that each petitioner, in
circumstances which gave him the status of an enemy belligerent,
passed our military and naval lines and defenses or went behind
those lines, in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. The offense
was complete when with that purpose they entered-or, having so
entered, they remained upon-our territory in time of war without
198); Rostow, supra note 198 (“Korematsu is objectionable because the government
used race alone as the basis for predicting who was a threat to national security and
who would remain free.”).
200 E.g., HURST, supra note 27, at 147-48; Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900.
201 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted) (“The case was not this Court’s finest hour. The Court
upheld the commission and denied relief in a brief per curiam issued the day after oral
argument concluded . . . a week later the Government carried out the commission’s
death sentence upon six saboteurs, including Haupt. The Court eventually explained
its reasoning in a written opinion issued several months later.”).
202 Cf. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 644 (1947) (upholding the
conviction a civilian co-conspirator to the conspiracy in Ex parte Quirin for treason by
giving aid and comfort rather than levying war).
203 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality) (Black, J.).
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uniform or other appropriate means of identification. For that
reason, even when committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct
from the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the
Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is
irrelevant to the other.204

Upon close reading, the Court is applying the rule
against constructive treasons to two variations of “the crime of
treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution”205: the
addition of the “absence of uniform” 206 requirement and the
subtraction of a citizenship or allegiance requirement. The
Court found that the addition of a no-uniform requirement was
an essential element and, “[f]or that reason, even when
committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of
treason.”207 In fact, the assertion that the offense is not distinct
from treason “leaves out of account the nature of the offense [of
unlawful belligerency].” 208 In applying the rule, the Court
should have focused on the irrelevancy of a uniform element to
treason rather than the relevancy of it to unlawful belligerency,
as elements are added to treason in this formulation209: “since
the absence of uniform essential to [unlawful belligerency] is
irrelevant to [treason].”210 In essence, therefore, the Court employed
the additive formulation of the rule against constructive
treasons and merely misapplied it, rather than contradicting
the rule.211
In 1945, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment
to the rule against constructive treasons in Cramer v. United
States, further making clear that the Supreme Court did not
intend to upend the rule against constructive treasons. 212
Cramer was an appeal from the treason trial of one of Haupt’s
co-conspirators. Based on the same set of facts and less than
three years later, the Court again affirmed its commitment to
the rule against constructive treasons in a significantly deeper
treatment of the topic than in Quirin.213 It clarified that it did
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-8 (1942) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 38.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Cf. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125-26 (1807).
210 Rosenberg v. United States, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (1952).
211 See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952) (“[T]he
absence of uniform [in Quirin] was an additional element[.]”).
212 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945).
213 Id.; see also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947) (holding that
Haupt’s father, who never donned a Nazi uniform, was guilty of treason by giving aid
and comfort).
204
205
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not “intimate that Congress could dispense with . . . [Article III
protections] by giving the same offense another name.”214
Additionally, and more directly toward the facts of
Quirin, there is another, later Supreme Court case about the
trial of Haupt’s father, Hans, a co-conspirator to the same plot,
which supports this reading and for the limiting Quirin when
the exigencies of war disappeared. Hans was convicted at trial
of treason and appealed. 215 The Court’s 1947 case regarding
that appeal, Haupt v. United States,216 confirms this reading of
Quirin as a materiality-of-individual-elements analysis
utilizing the additive formulation. Haupt was an appeal from
the treason trial of Haupt’s father, Hans, another coconspirator. While both father and son were part of the same
Nazi conspiracy, the father never donned a Nazi uniform—the
uniform that made the difference between unlawful
belligerency and treason in Quirin.
Application of a rule—even with questionable analysis—
cannot be said to signify abandonment of the rule itself. 217
Therefore, the problem with Quirin is not that the Court has
abandoned the rule against constructive treasons, but instead
that the Quirin framework is inapt; similar to how Korematsu—
if still cited today—would be an unsuitable framework for the
application of strict scrutiny to facial racial classifications. Thus,
Quirin properly rests within treason law as a Korematsu-like
wartime aberration. 218 Albeit Quirin is lesser in magnitude, is
still similarly is not a contradiction of the rule against
constructive treasons.219 The Court did not reject the restrictive
rule; it merely applied it incorrectly.220
The Quirin Court did not need to reach the issue of
whether the subtraction of either the citizenship or allegiance
requirement would create a material difference because any
single material variation makes an offense distinct from
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45.
Haupt, 330 U.S. at 631.
216 Id. at 631.
217 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying
questionable-at-best strict scrutiny to facial racial classifications while not invalidating
strict scrutiny for facial racial classifications).
218 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[Quirin] was not this Court’s finest hour.” (internal citations omitted)); Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Korematsu as one
of the worst Supreme Court decisions in history).
219 Contra Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900; but see Hurst, supra note 186, at 421.
220 The questionable application is similar—albeit lesser in magnitude—to the
application of strict scrutiny for facial racial classifications in Korematsu. See generally
Rostow, supra note 198.
214
215
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treason. Rather, the Court seems to assume such a variation
would create a constructive treason221: the Court’s precedent in
Wiltberger expressly shows that the recitation of an allegiance
requirement does not affect the construction of treason.222
b. The Quirin Problem in the Circuits
The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have had
the occasion to weigh in on the link between terrorism and
treason by levying war. To date, each court has fallen into the
first peril. As a result of the Quirin problem, the courts have
drawn an immaterial distinction between treason and would-be
constructive treasons.
In 1952, in United States v. Rosenberg, the Second Circuit
became the first court to recognize the potential for incongruous
“inferior court[ ] ” results from and the severe criticism of the
Quirin decision:
This ruling has been criticized. But this ruling binds inferior courts
such as ours. In the Quirin case, the absence of uniform was an
additional element, essential to [unlawful belligerency] although
irrelevant to . . . treason; in the Rosenbergs’ case, an essential
element of treason, giving aid to an ‘enemy,’ is irrelevant to the
espionage offense.
....
. . . [T]he Quirin case had the unavoidable consequence of permitting
death sentences to be imposed upon the citizen-saboteurs for crimes
other than treason.223

The Rosenberg case dealt with the appeal from the
conviction for the espionage-related offenses of the most infamous
Soviet atomic spies. 224 The Rosenbergs asserted that espionage
offenses are a constructive treason under the giving aid and
comfort definition of treason.225 The Rosenberg court’s denial of
the defense and reasoning would prove to be prescient.

221 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942) (“For that reason, even when
committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of treason defined in
Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is
irrelevant to the other.” (emphasis added)).
222 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820).
223 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952) (internal
citations omitted); see id. at nn. 44-45; see also United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d
132, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1965).
224 Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 588-90, 611; see also Drummond, 354 F.2d at 152-53.
225 Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 588-90, 610; see also Drummond, 354 F.2d at 152-53.
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In 1986, in United States v. Rodriguez, the Seventh
Circuit decided the appeal brought by a convicted member of
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña
(FALN), “an armed clandestine terrorist organization seeking
independence for Puerto Rico.” 226 Rodriguez was convicted of
seditious conspiracy to levy war for his role in the attempted
bombing of U.S. military facilities in Chicago.227 The appellant
challenged the seditious conspiracy statute on the grounds “that
[it] [was] merely a ‘constructive treason’ statute that dispense[d]
with the constitutional requirement[s].”228 Comparing seditious
conspiracy to treason, the court engaged in analysis of what
“requirements” differed between treason and seditious
conspiracy, and of the different interests in criminalizing the
conduct.229 The court held “that [seditious conspiracy] does not
conflict with the [T]reason [C]lause. [Seditious conspiracy] protects
a different governmental interest and proscribes a different
crime.”230 Among other things, the Rodriguez court contended that
seditious conspiracy lacked an allegiance element.231 The court
did not clearly decide whether the absence of an allegiance
element, by itself, would make a material difference because it
focused on the cumulative differences between the elements of
treason and seditious conspiracy.232
In 1999, in United States v. Rahman, the Second Circuit
affirmed the use of “analogous” sentencing guidelines for
treason by levying of war when deciding the punishment for
the participants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.233
The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit sedition
by levying war. 234 The court held that, with respect to the
constructive treason defense raised, 235 “[The] Treason Clause
does not apply to the prosecution. The [Treason Clause]
appl[ies] to prosecutions for ‘treason.’” Further, “[The defendants]
United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 319 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id.
228 Id. at 320.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000).
234 Id at 103.
235 Id. at 113 (“Nosair suggests that allegiance to the United States is not an
element of treason within the contemplation of the Constitution. He concludes that, for
constitutional purposes, the elements constituting seditious conspiracy by levying war
and treason by levying war are identical, and consequently that prosecutions for seditious
conspiracy by levying war must conform to the requirements of the Treason Clause.”).
226
227

2013]

TWIN PERILS OF THE AL-AULAQI CASE

267

were not charged with treason. Their offense . . . seditious
conspiracy . . . differs from treason not only in name and
associated stigma, but also in its essential elements and
punishment.” 236 The Rahman court reasoned that seditious
conspiracy is distinct from treason for two primary reasons.237
First, the seditious conspiracy statute subtracts an allegiance
element; and second, a seditious alien is less stigmatized in his
home country than a treasonous citizen.238 The Rahman court,
however, citing Quirin, noted that “the question [of] whether the
[Treason] [C]lause applies to offenses that include all the
elements of treason but are not branded as such” remains open.239
In 2011, in United States v. Augustin, the Eleventh Circuit
cited the Second Circuit’s Rahman decision and the Seventh
Circuit’s Rodriguez decision in denying the appeal of Augustine
(not Augustin), an al-Qaeda operative. 240 Augustine asserted a
constructive treason defense during his trial where he was charged
with providing material support to a terrorist organization.241 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that “neither . . . statutes under which
Augustine was convicted—include allegiance to the United States
as an element of the offense.” Therefore, it had “no trouble
concluding that these offenses, as defined by Congress, do not fall
within the ambit of the Treason Clause.”242
Although the Rodriguez, Rahman, and Augustin courts
all reached the right result regarding seditious conspiracy, they
did so by basing their decisions on the wrong premise. While
they impermissibly focused upon the presence or absence of an
allegiance requirement—especially because Wiltberger expressly
proscribes that construction—they ignored the existence of a
unique, and materially different, element in seditious
conspiracy: the conspiracy. As explained by the Supreme Court
in Bollman, conspiracy to levy war is a separate and distinct
Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
Id. at 112-13.
238 Id. at 112-13, n.9 (noting that seditious conspiracy is a “lesser offense,”
thus, “[w]hether any of the defendants in fact owed allegiance to the United States and
thus could have been prosecuted for treason if the other requirements to make such a
prosecution were satisfied is immaterial”). Whether the necessary and sufficient nature
of the treason definition affects the merging of offenses under the Doctrine of Lesser
Included Offenses has not been addressed.
239 Id. at 113 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38).
240 United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1117 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); United States
v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012).
241 Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1117 (citing Rahman, 189 F.3d at 113; Rodriguez,
803 F.2d at 320)
242 Id.
236
237
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offense from treason because it adds a unique material element:
conspiracy itself.243 Treason by levying war requires overt acts
tantamount to levying war, not merely overt acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy.244 Applying the Bollman reasoning to seditious
conspiracy produces the same result reached by the Circuits,
but it does so without the need for an elemental inquiry that
was performed over 200 years ago.245
Additionally, the Circuits have fundamentally misapplied
Wiltberger’s holding regarding the allegiance or citizenship
requirement of treason. In Wiltberger, Chief Justice Marshall
compared the treason statute with the misprision (failing to
report actual knowledge of) of treason statute. 246 As Marshall
noted, “The words . . . ‘owing allegiance to the United States’ [in
the treason statute] . . . are entirely surplus words, which do not,
in the slightest degree, affect its sense.”247 The Circuits certainly
understood the material necessity of allegiance, as discussed in
Wiltberger, 248 but they failed to recognize that a recitation of
allegiance is neither material nor necessary. Wiltberger held
that, when comparing the treason statute to another statute,
the express inclusion of an allegiance element in the treason
statute has no effect.249 If the allegiance element were omitted
from the treason statute—such that the language of the statute
precisely mirrored the constitutional clause—then the flaws in
the elemental analysis performed by the Second, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits are clear. Therefore, to give effect to
Wiltberger, courts must construe the treason statute as if
allegiance were not an element, but rather a mere factual
precondition necessary for the mens rea.250 The principal idea is
that a person must owe an allegiance to commit treason, so
when someone owing an allegiance does what is substantively
treason, his or her act is treason and not some other crime.
Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125-26 (1807).
Id.
245 See id. at 127. Compare 18 U.S.C § 2384 (2012) (seditious conspiracy), with
18 U.S.C § 2381 (treason).
246 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-9 (1820). The Court
reprinted the statutes in question at footnote “a.” Id. at 80 n.a. The language of the
treason statute is substantially the same except for the possibility of lesser
punishment. Compare id. (defining the crime of treason in 1820), with 18 U.S.C § 2381
(modern treason statute).
247 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 97 (interpreting the treason statute,
which is now codified at 18 U.S.C § 2381).
248 E.g., United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 97) (“‘[T]reason is a breach of allegiance, and can be
committed by him only who owes allegiance.’”).
249 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 96-97.
250 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
243
244
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Notwithstanding flaws in their reasoning, each of these
Circuits—and even the Supreme Court in Quirin—has
indicated an inclination to engage in the mirroring, additive,
and subtractive analysis for detecting substantive differences
between treason and the statute in question. In addition to
expressly affirming the mirroring formulation in Cramer, the
Supreme Court used the subtractive formulation in Wiltberger,
the additive formulation in Bollman, and—questionable result
aside—in Quirin. 251 But without guidance from the Supreme
Court on how to conduct such analysis, the constructive treason
defense is doomed because of the Quirin problem. The Seventh
Circuit analyzed whether the elements of the crime differed from
that of treason by listing each and every semantic distinction
that occurred to them, but it failed to consider the materiality of
those distinctions.252 The Second Circuit began to consider the
materiality of the differing elements, but, in contradicting
Wiltberger, it concluded that the lack of an allegiance element in
the seditious conspiracy statute was an essential distinction
from treason. 253 The Eleventh Circuit compared the elements,
but stopped its inquiry after noting that seditious conspiracy
lacked an allegiance requirement, and relied on its sister
circuits’ decisions on point rather than applying Wiltberger.254
Thus, the Supreme Court would merely need to synthesize its
previous rulings into these three coherent formulations to
resolve the analytical portion of the Quirin problem.
c. The Solution: “Korematsu” Quirin
If Korematsu—the first Supreme Court case expressly to
apply strict scrutiny to facial classifications on the basis of
race—were considered to be the framework for applying strict
scrutiny today, a cogent Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence
would not exist. The similarly aberrant, wartime application of
the even more well-established rule against constructive
treasons should not constitute the framework for modern
application. Giving effect to Wiltberger, Bollman, Cramer, and
the above formulations of the rule against constructive treason
would fix the analytical problems faced by the Circuits in
applying the rule against constructive treasons post-Quirin. But
See supra Part IV.A.1 & note 165.
United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986).
253 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 111-13 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
254 United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1117 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012).
251
252

270

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1

the uniform issue remains. How may terrorists, like al-Aulaqi,
who presumably never wear military uniforms, avoid the specific
holding of Quirin? And are certain acts committed by a citizen
treasonous only if committed while wearing a uniform?255
There is one very simple and commonsense way to avoid
the confusion created by Quirin, at least in the context of
targeted killing: limit Quirin to its facts. As Judge McMahon
noted in granting summary judgment for the Government in
New York Times Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice:
Both Quirin and Hamdi involved individuals who were in United
States custody. Quirin remains the lone case upholding the right to
try a United States citizen before a military commission; it said
nothing at all about killing a United States citizen without any sort
of trial. Hamdi addressed the right of a United States citizen
detained in the United States as an enemy combatant to challenge
his confinement via habeas corpus. Again, there was no suggestion
that Mr. Hamdi was to be executed without some kind of trial.256

Justice Scalia’s Hamdi dissent provides additional
jurisprudential support for reading Quirin as narrowly holding
that the Government has a right to exercise military jurisdiction
over a U.S. citizen in certain, extreme circumstances.257
Moreover, according to the Quirin court, and on the
facts before it, a uniform was an “appropriate means of
identification.” 258 Today, however, the Government could not
claim, with any validity, that the absence of a uniform affects
its ability to identify al-Aulaqi. The cases of Herbert Haupt and
Anwar al-Aulaqi arose in very different contexts. Haupt took
up a uniform in serving Nazi Germany, 259 a well-organized
enemy with a central government, and was captured on U.S.
soil. 260 Al-Aulaqi never wore a uniform, did not work for an
enemy that could be described as an effectively organized
central government, and was stalked by a predator drone in
255 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942). The Supreme Court’s opinion
in Hamdi may be read as signaling that it is uncomfortable with the result in Quirin.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 548-49 (2004) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J.) (“Ex
parte Quirin may perhaps be claimed for the proposition that the American citizenship
of such a captive does not as such limit the Government’s power to deal with him under
the usages of war.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); see also id. at 569-72 & n.4
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
256 N.Y. Times Co v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 526 n.13
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
257 Id. at 523 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 569-72 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.
259 Id. at 21.
260 Id. at 21-22.
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Yemen.261 In Haupt’s case, a Nazi uniform would have helped
the U.S. government to identify its enemy as he walked along
the beaches of Long Island and the streets of New York City
(and in fact an abandoned one did). In al-Aulaqi’s case, by way
of contrast, the targeted nature of the drone strike262 permits the
inference that the Government had no trouble identifying alAulaqi, even from the sky, well before striking. Although a
uniform may assist in the identification of terrorists in some
cases, in the circumstance of targeted killing, where the
Government has already identified and located its target, it does
not. Therefore, Quirin, as well as Hamdi’s reliance on Quirin, is
inapposite to cases of targeted killing. This line of reasoning is
particularly damning to the Justice Department’s legal position
on the matter, as what has been revealed of the government’s
legal justification relies almost exclusively on Hamdi.263
B.

A Corruption of Blood and Citizen-Terrorist Property
Interests: Disparate Treatment

Prosecution under a differently named crime that
affords the protections of the Treason Clause is a harmless
constructive treason because the Treason Clause was complied
with in all but name. 264 That is to say, if a prosecution for
terrorism was in fact a prosecution for constructive treason, but
the defendant was afforded the processes due to a traitor, the
error would be harmless. 265 In al-Aulaqi’s case, there are
numerous obvious ways that his treatment did not comport with
the Treason Clause. This section focuses on the one example of
the disparate treatment between terrorists and traitors: the
corruption of blood. Rather than being treated as a traitor’s
assets, al-Aulaqi’s assets were treated as a non-citizen
terrorist’s assets. 266 They were subject to total forfeiture and
261 See supra Part II (discussing how al-Aulaqi worked for AQAP, a non-state
terrorist organization notable for deceptive and nefarious tactics).
262 See supra Part II (discussing the precision drone strike that killed alAulaqi).
263 See infra note 298.
264 United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 152 (2d Cir. 1965) (“[I]t is also
settled that an offense must incorporate all the elements of treason in order for the
two-witness rule to apply.”); see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 111-13 (2d Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (“[The defendant’s] conviction was not supported by two witnesses
to the same overt act. Accordingly the conviction must be overturned if the requirement
of the Treason Clause applies to this prosecution.”); see also United States v.
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952).
265 Cf. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 111-13.
266 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G) (2012); Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101,
at 43233-34.
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seizure by order of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.267 In
light of Van Riswick, and because al-Aulaqi is properly
characterized as a traitor, those assets must divest completely
from the Government and pass on to al-Aulaqi’s successors in
interest.268 If any assets seized pursuant to al-Aulaqi’s designation
as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, or forfeited under 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G),269 have not yet divested completely from the
Government, then the bar against corruptions of blood is violated.
Incidentally, this particular form of asset protection
provides relief for the standing issue that predicated the
dismissal in al-Aulaqi v. Obama.270 By creating an injury in fact
to al-Aulaqi’s estate (unlawful seizure of Anwar’s assets under
Treasury Department terrorism procedures), the government
thus confers third-party standing on the executor.271 Further,
the petitioners in al-Aulaqi v. Panetta employed executory
interest as the basis for standing; the ACLU asserts standing
for Nasser al-Aulaqi not as father, but as executor.272 If Nasser
al-Aulaqi is able to demonstrate his credentials as executor,
then the case will likely address the merits of the case.273
C.

Remedy for Violations of a Citizen’s Treason Clause Rights

Courts have treated failure to abide by the Treason
Clause as structural error, which demands automatic reversal
on appeal without a showing of prejudice.274 However, there are

18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G); Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101, at 43233-01.
Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 209 (1875).
269 § 981(a)(1)(G) (providing that all of a terrorist’s assets, real or personal,
foreign or domestic, are subject to forfeiture).
270 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2010).
271 Judge Bates hinted that the ACLU may be able to surmount the standing
issue by asserting official executory interest. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26
(citing Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.D.C. 1983) (“The D.C.
wrongful death statute does not provide a basis for plaintiff ’ s alleged legally protected
interest in preserving his relationship with his adult son, as it only protects persons
who are ‘officially appointed executors or administrators of the child’s estate’. . . . There
is no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff is the ‘executor or administrator’ of
Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s estate, and the Court is aware of no other possible statutory basis
for plaintiff ’ s alleged legally protected interest.”)).
272 Panetta Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶ 6.
273 Defs. Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 1:12-cv-01192-RMC
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (contesting standing on the narrow grounds that plaintiffs “failed to
properly alleg[e]” that they are “decedents’ personal [estate] representatives” because
the plaintiffs must have previously “file[d] with the Register a copy of the appointment
as personal representative.”).
274 See United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2010) (defining a
structural error); cf. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 181 (Marshall, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14692a) (dismissing a High Treason charge against
267
268
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valid arguments for a different standard of review. The
guarantees of the Treason Clause have never been subjected to a
standard of review such as those employed in due process or
equal protection cases. The Supreme Court has never addressed
the question of whether all violations require immediate
reversal or if there may be circumstances in which a state’s
interests outweigh the harm of the deprivation.
Supreme Court precedent indicates that automatic
reversal results from the deprivation of any of the procedural
protections afforded by the Treason Clause. In United States v.
Burr, Justice Marshall dismissed the High Treason charge
against Aaron Burr because, as an evidentiary matter, the
Government had not provided two witnesses to the same overt
treasonous act. 275 Hundreds of years later, in Rahman, the
Second Circuit stated that “[i]t is undisputed that [the
defendant]’s conviction was not supported by two witnesses to
the same overt act. Accordingly, the conviction must be
overturned if the requirement of the Treason Clause applies to
this prosecution for seditious conspiracy.”276
The Judiciary is responsible for ensuring that the
Government does not abuse its power by declaring a person an
enemy of the state in order to suppress that person’s political
activities.277 The procedural protections in the Treason Clause
do not exist simply to make prosecution more challenging.
Rather, they exist to safeguard against improper accusations,
which would be manifest miscarriages of justice were they
brought to trial. A court can tell the difference between a
treason prosecution for the purpose of suppressing minority
political activity and one to address a security threat without
Aaron Burr as there were no two witnesses to the same overt act); see also United
States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
275 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 13 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No.
14692a) (“[Treason] . . . must be proved by two witnesses . . . . Under the control of this
constitutional regulation, I am to inquire whether the testimony laid before me
furnishes probable cause in support of this charge.”); see also United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 55, 180 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14693) (“This opinion
does not comprehend the proof by two witnesses . . . .”).
276 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 112.
277 The matter that concerned the Founding Fathers was really the use of
treason convictions by political factions to “[wreak] alternate malignity on each other.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 29. For example, if al-Aulaqi were not in any way
related to the operations of AQAP and publically spoke as a cleric against policies of
the United States, then his actions wouldn’t be treason by levying war, but likely
political speech covered by the First Amendment. But cf. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 449-50 (1969). Depending on the specific content of the speech, however, if it
“incite[d] his listeners to imminent lawless action,” it would forfeit First Amendment
protection. Id.
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entering into deep and exhaustive inquiry. Where the
government kills traitors without process to address a clear,
imminent security threat, no such miscarriage exists, and
procedural defects should be subject to less stringent review.
D.

Treason Clause Externalities: A Brief Discussion of the
Effect of Article III, Section iii on the Political Question
Doctrine

A court scrutinizing the Government action in al-Aulaqi
v. Obama would need to determine if al-Aulaqi was a military
threat. This turns on the question of how a court could qualify
a threat to determine the appropriateness of the responding
force. 278 As the judge in al-Aulaqi v. Obama held, such an
inquiry is the traditional hallmark of a non-justiciable political
question. 279 But some commentators have argued that it is
not.280 The application of the political question doctrine in alAulaqi v. Obama was mere dicta: the court had already held
that the plaintiffs lacked standing and it did not need to reach
the issue of political question nonjusticiability.281 Nevertheless,
with respect to a constructive treason defense, consideration of
two of the six factors considered in political question
jurisprudence—a textually demonstrable commitment to a
coordinate branch of the Government, and the lack of a judicially
manageable standard of determination—is informative as the
analysis of these factors changes significantly when the Treason
Clause comes into play.282
The Judiciary is not allowed to intrude upon issues
where there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a
278 Ex ante determinations on the appropriateness of military decisions like
this this traditionally have been relegated to the realm of non-justiciable political
questions. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2010). The
Court, however, has clearly signaled that it will entertain challenges to actions under
the war power. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
279 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47.
280 E.g., Dehn & Heller, supra note 8.
281 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (standing); id. at 52 (justiciability).
282 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (plurality opinion) (“Prominent on
the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.”).
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coordinate branch of government because “[t]he nonjusticiability
of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of
powers.”283 The fact that the Treason Clause appears in Article
III, and not Article I or II, reveals no such textual commitment.
Rather, it represents a textually demonstrable commitment to
the Judiciary to administer treason law.284 Thus, the al-Aulaqi
court’s reliance on the textual delegation of foreign affairs and
war-making authority to the Executive and Congress285 would
be inapposite in a Treason Clause challenge.
While such an interpretation may seem overly textual,
the Government, in moving to dismiss the al-Aulaqi v. Panetta
suit, used a parallel reading. The ACLU complaint alleged that
“[the Government’s] actions constituted an unconstitutional act
of attainder because [the Government] designated Anwar AlAulaqi for death without the protections of a judicial
trial . . . .”286 Bills of attainder are always unconstitutional under
Article I.287 The Government asserts that “the Bill of Attainder
Clause applies to bills: legislative acts—not executive ones”
because “[the] clause is found in Article I of the Constitution, the
article addressing the powers of Congress.”288 The Government’s
position is correct insofar as Supreme Court jurisprudence
states, attainders are a “category of Congressional actions
which the Constitution barred.”289 However, if the court accepts
the Government’s textual argument that the prohibition on
attainders does not apply to the Executive because of its
placement in Article I, then it must analogously construe the
Treason Clause’s judicial restrictions and responsibilities.
Further, the CIA Counterterrorism Center legal team
has created a “judicially discoverable and manageable
standard.”290 “These [counterterrorism] operations are conducted in
strict accordance with American law and are governed by legal
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing separation of powers); see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the
separation of powers regarding treason law and the role of the judiciary).
285 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 47-48.
286 Panetta Complaint, supra note 20 at ¶ 43.
287 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9 cl. 3. The Government’s motion to dismiss also
asserts several cases to support its proposition.
288 Defs. Motion to Diss. at 44-45, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 1:12-cv-01192-RMC
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
289 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (emphasis added); see
also Paradissiotis v. Rubin, 171 F.3d 983, 988 (5th Cir. 1999); Global Relief Found., Inc.
v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2002); Walmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 52 F.3d
851, 855 (10th Cir. 1995).
290 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see supra Part V.A.2.a (describing
the trial-like adjudication by the CIA).
283
284
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guidance provided by the Department of Justice.”291 Thus, the basis
for CIA adjudication and approval of citizen-terrorists for lethal
operation is a “legalistic and carefully argued” analysis.292
In fact, in February 2013, the Department of Justice
released a presumably redacted version of its “al-Aulaqi White
Paper,” 293 which provides the previously classified 294 “legal
framework for considering the circumstances in which the U.S.
government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside
the area of active hostilities . . . against a U.S. citizen who is a
senior operational leader of . . . an associated force of al-Qa’ida.”295
The standard is a three-part inquiry, and asks whether:
(1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has
determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible,
and the United States continues to monitor whether capture
becomes feasible; (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner
consistent with the applicable law of war principles.296

McKlevey, supra note 16.
Id.
293 A.k.a, “the drone memo,” “the al-Qulaqi white papers,” etc. Many names have
been used to refer to this DOJ unsigned white paper in the press and in scholarship. See,
e.g., Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memomade-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
294 Obviously, the white paper has been at least partially declassified. Judge
McMahon’s finding in N.Y. Times Co. that the Government had not waived the
classified status of the entire “al-Aulaqi White Paper” because, with respect to the
public disclosures by Attorney General Holder that would have been the basis for such
a waiver, N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp.2d 508, 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (citing Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech at the Northwestern University
School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012)), was based on such disclosure being “a far cry from a
legal research memorandum.” Id. It is no longer the case that the Obama
Administration’s disclosures on that topic are a far cry, but are in fact exactly such a
memorandum, which purportedly “reveal[s] the exact legal reasoning behind the
Government’s conclusion that its actions comply with domestic and international law.”
Id. at 536-37 & n.29. See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER: LAWFULNESS OF A
LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL
LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1 (2013). Therefore, the rest of the
White Paper, Savage, supra note 293 (describing the document as approximately fifty
pages), might discuss the Government position on the Treason Clause and has been a
change in circumstances which may demand a change in Judge McMahon’s findings
and compel full publication. Cf. N.Y. Times Co., 915 F. Supp.2d at 535-36 (citing
Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279, 294 (2d Cir. 1999)); Public Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 11
F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F. Supp.
145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held
contrary to Judge McMahon. See generally ACLU v. CIA, No. 11–5320, 2013 WL
1003688 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2013) (Garland, C.J.).
295 AL-AULAQI WHITE PAPER, supra note 294, at 1.
296 Id. at 1, 6.
291
292
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Hence, the al-Aulaqi holding that no such standard is
intelligibly discernible297 is in error.298 It strains all credulity to
believe that the CIA lawyers and the Department of Justice are
more capable than a court in applying an “extremely robust”299
rule with “a solid legal foundation” to determine if a citizen
should die300 for acts that may be constitutionally punished only
if the Judiciary has discharged its Article III responsibility. It is
particularly true that courts are more capable when the
standard is “[b]ased on generations-old legal principles and
Supreme Court decisions handed down since WWII, as well as
during this current [War on Terror].”301
Therefore, with respect to the essential inquiry of the
political question doctrine—the textually demonstrable
commitment that separates a power from coordinate branches of
government—the assertion of a constructive treason defense in alAulaqi-type cases allocates the Government’s responsibility of
administering treason law to the Judiciary, rather than either the

Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47 (D.D.C. 2010).
See N.Y. Times Co., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26 & nn.13, 15 (describing the
well-developed standard). However, there is an obvious flaw in the Government’s
standard: the reliance on Hamdi alone as a jurisprudential basis for the framework.
AL-AULAQI WHITE PAPER, supra note 294, at 6 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
534-35 (2004) (plurality opinion)). As Judge McMahon in the Southern District of New
York notes, the Hamdi and al-Aulaqi cases are readily distinguishable: “Hamdi
addressed the right of a United States citizen . . . to challenge his confinement . . . there
was no suggestion that Mr. Hamdi was to be executed without some kind of trial.” N.Y.
Times Co., 915 F. Supp.2d at 526 n.13. Or, as the government states in the Panetta
legislation, “Hamdi involved the habeas claim of a U.S. citizen challenging his military
detention in the United States, a context wholly distinct from the alleged use of lethal
force abroad to target a leader of an armed enemy group.” Defs. Reply Brief at 6, AlAulaqi v. Panetta, 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Thus, the
standard relies on a case decided in a significantly different context, where the right to
life was not at issue in the Mathews balancing performed by the Court. Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 534-35. The larger issue is that this standard, while being touted as “extremely
robust” and “[b]ased on generations-old legal principles and Supreme Court decisions
handed down during WWII, as well as during this current conflict,” relies erroneously
on Hamdi and Quirin. See New York Times Co., 915 F. Supp.2d at 525 n.15. Either the
standard is developed enough where some manageable legal standard exists for
making for these sorts of determinations, or the determinations are arbitrary and
capricious actions, which would fail even rational basis review, and which even more
strongly demands judicial intervention to grant relief to citizens being deprived of their
right to life by unconstitutional state action. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying
text (discussing this footnote).
299 N.Y. Times Co., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (quoting Harold Koh, State
Department Legal Advisor, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law in Washington, DC. (Mar. 25, 2012), available at http://www.cfr.org/
international–law/legal–adviser–kohs–speech–obamaadministration–international–law–
march–2010/p22300).
300 McKlevey, supra note 16.
301 N.Y. Times Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (quoting Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y
Gen., Speech at the Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012)).
297
298
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Executive or Congress. Further, there is a judicially manageable
standard by which a court may do so.
V.

THE SECOND PERIL: THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Even if a court reviewing an al-Aulaqi-like case avoids
the first peril, it must ensure that its treatment of the
defendant does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Because there is no substantial difference between treason by
levying war and terrorism when committed by a U.S. citizen;
the two crimes are intrinsically the same offense within the
meaning of Skinner. 302 Thus, the Government has made an
“invidious . . . discrimination” that must pass strict scrutiny if
it “lays an unequal hand” on the two classes of offenders.303
A.

Lays An Unequal Hand: Different Treatment of CitizenTerrorists and Traitors with Respect to Legal Process
and Access to the Judiciary

A comparison of the legal protections afforded to
terrorists and traitors reveals significant differences with
respect to the legal process provided prior to a determination to
end the individual’s life, and with respect to access to the
Judiciary. One’s status as either a traitor or terrorist will
shape the accused’s access to the courts and legal process.
1. The Right to Life
Many commentators have discussed the unprecedented
nature of the al-Aulaqi killing with respect to his right to life,
albeit not in an equal protection context.304 Yet the fact remains
that no other criminal in the United States has ever been
sentenced to death by drone without a trial.
Although the federal statute for treason prescribes a
sentence of death, 305 it also gives significant latitude to the
sentencing judge. This latitude permits that the traitor “be
imprisoned not less than five years and fined . . . not less than
$10,000.” 306 By contrast, the terrorism statute mandates a
sentence much less severe than capital punishment. 307 Thus,
302
303
304
305
306
307

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Id.
See supra note 24.
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012).
Id.
Id. § 2332b(g)(5); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c).
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had al-Aulaqi been tried before an Article III court and found
guilty of treason, he could have had a chance to plea for a
lesser sentence than the one the CIA imposed. Additionally,
and perversely, had al-Aulaqi been found guilty of treason, the
court would have had a stronger constitutional basis for
imposing a death sentence.
2. Access to the Judicial System
The availability of these alternative punishments,
however, presupposes access to the courts. Accused traitors are
given the full rights of any person accused of a capital offense
in a federal prosecution,308 such as the right to a jury trial309
and the right to appeal. 310 Additionally, the accused would
benefit from the special requirements of treason prosecutions:
its evidentiary requirement and its prohibition on corruptions
of blood.311 The Supreme Court has vigilantly protected these
treason rights, so to speak, since the early founding of the
Republic.312 When a terrorist target like al-Aulaqi is approved
for a lethal operation, he or she likely will be executed. That is
to say, terrorists may be killed without trial or appeal,313 but
traitors may not be killed without either.
a. Trial by the CIA Rather Than by Jury
In Ex parte Bollman, the Supreme Court determined
that the question of whether an accused traitor has levied war
is a matter of fact for a jury to decide.314 In al-Aulaqi’s case, the
determination that he was a terrorist who deserved death came
from a different source: the CIA.315 In such circumstances, the
308 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting, among other things, the right to
confront witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (providing for the right to counsel in federal
capital cases).
309 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amend. VI; see also Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 117, 119-20 (1970) (“[T]he federal right to jury trial attaches where an offense is
punishable by as much as six months imprisonment. I think this follows both from the
breadth of the language of the Sixth Amendment, which provides for a jury in ‘all
criminal prosecutions,’ and the evidence of historical practice.”). Treason, being
punishable by a minimum of five years and a maximum of death, clearly has the right
to a jury trial attached. 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
310 18 U.S.C. § 3732; Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1).
311 U.S. CONST. art III, § 3.
312 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
313 See generally, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
314 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 118 (1807) (“[It] [i]s impossible to
define what should in every case be deemed a levying of war. It is a question of fact to
be decided by the jury from all the circumstances.”).
315 Miller, supra note 110.
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CIA is not making a routine administrative decision; it is
conducting a trial-like adjudication.316 Even where an agency,
rather than a court, makes a determination, some due process
rights attach. Where “a relatively small number of persons [is]
concerned, who [are] exceptionally affected [by the agency
action at issue], in each case upon individual grounds,” a
hearing is required.317
An individual must meet the CIA’s legal standard to be
classified as a terrorist subject to targeted killing.318 Pursuant
to a secret 50-page Department of Justice white paper
outlining the terrorist classification process, 319 approximately
10 CIA Counterterrorism Center attorneys receive a “‘two page
document,’ along with ‘an appendix with supporting information,
if anybody want[s] to read all of it.’” 320 The attorneys then
prepare a “cable” that “often run[s] up to five pages.”321 Senior
attorneys will review the cable for errors, such as if “‘the
justification in approving a person for lethal operation] would
be that the person was thought to be at a meeting [but was
not].’”322 The cable is then sent to the CIA’s General Counsel for
approval.323 At any given time, there are about 30 individuals
approved for targeting.324
The CIA determined that al-Aulaqi was an appropriate
target of a lethal operation because he was the “leader of
external operations” 325 in AQAP, and, accordingly, he was a
terrorist and a military threat. 326 It is undisputed that al316 Dreyfuss, supra note 24 (“When an agency makes a binding decision on the
rights of a particular party by reference to historical facts, it is conducting an
adjudication.” (citations omitted)).
317 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915).
Undoubtedly, a single person facing the prospect of death by Hellfire missile would be a
sufficiently small number of persons: to say that he would be exceptionally affected by
the adjudication is an understatement.
318 McKlevey, supra note 16. For the purposes of this note, we will assume
that al-Aulaqi was subject to these standards, albeit that the relevant action was the
final determination by the Obama Administration. Islamist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki killed
in Yemen, B.B.C. NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east15121879.
319 McKlevey, supra note 16.
320 Id. (quoting John A. Rizzo).
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3, at A1 (quoting President Obama).
326 According to Scott Shane, the Government’s legal basis for lethal
operations approval is as follows:

First, he posed an imminent threat to the lives of Americans, having
participated in plots to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and to bomb
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Aulaqi levied war.327 His actions conformed to the definition of
treason: he assembled with others to commit overt acts to
usurp the Government’s authority for non-private motives; and
importantly, he was a citizen who owed allegiance to—and
therefore betrayed—the United States.328 Thus, because he was
a traitor, his guilt and punishment were questions for a jury,
not for the President and his men.329
b. Equal Access to Appellate Courts
The right to appeal for indigent classes is protected by
the Equal Protection Clause. 330 In Douglas v. California, the
Supreme Court held that a state cannot invidiously discriminate
by providing different appellate processes to protected classes.331
In Douglas, the discriminatory classification at issue was the
more mundane classification of wealth.332 In al-Aulaqi’s case, the
different treatment between citizen-terrorists and traitors is a
product of invidious discrimination between two classes of
alleged criminals who committed intrinsically the same
two cargo planes last year. Second, he was fighting alongside the enemy in
the armed conflict with Al Qaeda. And finally, in the chaos of Yemen, there
was no feasible way to arrest him.
Scott Shane, Judging a Long, Deadly Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/american-strike-on-american-target-revivescontentious-constitutional-issue.html#, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1.
The fact that al-Aulaqi was also targeted because of the infeasibility of arrest and
immanency of the threat will be discussed later, this note assumes those fact to be true,
but the merits of them are not relevant to this portion of the analysis. See infra Part
V.B (applying strict scrutiny).
Further, the DOJ in al-Aulaqi v. Obama used the President’s military and
commander-in-chief powers as the basis for asserting that the case fell within the
ambit of the political question doctrine. Opposition to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
at 19, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469).
327 See supra Part II (describing how al-Aulaqi called for jihad against the
United States, encouraged and assisted in the operations of a terrorist organization
that has claimed responsibility for attacking the United States); see also Dreyfuss,
supra note 24, at 269-70 (stating that al-Aulaqi had levied war).
328 See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820) (“Treason
is a breach of allegiance, and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance . . . .”);
cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945) (“[I]f there is no intent to betray,
there is no treason.”).
329 The Treason Clause was meant to restrict the powers of the individual
government branches with respect to the handling of traitors, not permit the executive
to sit as judge, jury, and executioner. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 24, at 1205-06.
330 E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that indignant
petitioners who are denied free trial transcripts are discriminated against on the basis
of wealth in terms of their right to an appeal).
331 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963); see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
332 372 U.S. at 357-58; see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
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offense, 333 resulting in different treatment with respect to
appeals as a matter of right.
The President takes the position that he may order
killings of citizen-terrorists, a stance that is not subject to
judicial review under the political question and state secrets
doctrines.334 In al-Aulaqi v. Obama,335 the presiding judge noted
that it is constitutionally peculiar that executive decisions
regarding wiretapping citizens abroad were subject to judicial
review, but what were effectively kill warrants were not.336 The
judge ultimately agreed that the issuance of kill warrants is an
unreviewable political question.337
Additionally, the judge accepted the Government’s
claims that al-Aulaqi, or a person in a similar situation, could
avail himself of the courts, for example, by peaceably
surrendering at an embassy.338 This claim, however, presumes
two things. First, it presumes that there is a matter over which
to surrender. While al-Aulaqi was clearly a traitor, he was never
charged with any “terrorism-related crimes”339 or treason. The
Government’s position here begs the question: why would alAulaqi surrender on non-existent charges in order to appear in
court?340 The lack of a criminal indictment and the secret nature
of the CIA kill list341 negates any possibility that al-Aulaqi could
have received notice of the specific crimes or terrorist attacks for
which he was expected to surrender and stand trial.
Second, the Government’s claim that al-Aulaqi could
have accessed courts presumes that surrender presents itself
as a realistic option. The Government’s position, as accepted by
the court, essentially would have required al-Aulaqi to travel to
the U.S. embassy in Yemen. Likely possessing invaluable
information about his associates’ international criminal
conspiracy of terror, al-Aulaqi would have had to betray and
evade the murderous AQAP members, comrades that had kept
See supra Part III.C.
Opposition to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at II, V, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469) (Dep’t. of Justice).
335 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
336 Id. at 8.
337 Id. at 46.
338 Id. at 17-18.
339 Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 13 at ¶ 24.
340 Which, the ACLU properly recognized. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 18
(citing Pl.’s Opp. at 9) (arguing that deciding that al-Aulaqi needs to avail himself of
the judicial system decides the Government’s contention that “‘[al-Aulaqi was at the
time] a participant in an armed conflict against the United States.’”).
341 Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 273.
333
334
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him and that information safe from the Yemeni authorities.342 He
would have needed to travel through Yemen when he was wanted
for a crime for which he was sentenced in absentia.343 And, he
would have needed to do all of this while evading the freely
flying predator drone force of the U.S. government. 344
Essentially, al-Aulaqi was facing the same choice of Ben
Richards, the protagonist of The Running Man.345
Although some of these considerations are unique to alAulaqi’s case, and will not apply to all citizen-terrorists, the
first presumption stands as a legal point independently of the
second. If the Government adopts some form of notice system,
the second consideration must be at least examined when
discussing the concept of surrender. Thus, with respect to AlAulaqi, the court erred in holding that “[a]ll U.S. citizens may
avail themselves of the U.S. judicial system if they present
themselves peacefully, and no U.S. citizen may simultaneously
avail himself of the U.S. judicial system and evade U.S. law
enforcement authorities.”346
Further, and most importantly, the judge did not realize
the full implication of his conclusions that the targeting of alAulaqi was a political question. 347 As John C. Dehn notes,
“[t]argeted individuals thus might turn themselves in only to
find their status [as targeted for death] unreviewable as
a political question.” 348 The surrender option thus guarantees
no actual judicial relief to the Running Man conundrum under
al-Aulaqi v. Obama.
342 See, e.g., Savage, supra note 294. Al-Aulaqi evaded Yemeni commando
authorities for some time with the assistance of his terrorist associates. Id.
343 See supra note 97.
344 The U.S. has permission from Yemen to patrol with drones. Savage, supra
note 294.
345 See generally RICHARD BACHMAN, THE RUNNING MAN (1982). Ben Richards
competes in a game show, The Running Man, ostensibly to make some money for his
family. Id. The object of The Running Man is to survive: the participant is declared an
enemy of the U.S. government and elite hit men are sent to kill him in a thirty-day
worldwide excursion. Id. Richard Bachman is a pen name for Stephen King.
346 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
347 Id. at 46.
348 Dehn & Heller, supra note 8, at 185; accord Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp.2d at
46 (“Judicial resolution of the ‘particular questions posed by plaintiff in this case would
require this Court to decide: . . . whether there are ‘means short of lethal force’ that the
United States could ‘reasonably’ employ to address any threat that Anwar Al-Aulaqi
poses to U.S. national security interests . . . it becomes clear that plaintiff ’ s claims pose
precisely the types of complex policy questions that the D.C. Circuit has historically
held non-justiciable under the political question doctrine.” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)); see also id. at 52 (discussing the court’s lack of capacity). Cognizing any real
limitation on the Government’s power to deal with “any threat,” id., posed by an
individual infamous for devious and treacherous suicide bombing attempts seems to be
an impossible task.
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Consequently, although the Constitution guarantees
traitors more than a full spectrum of rights, citizen-terrorists
do not equally enjoy the right to a jury trial or an appeal of their
capital sentence. Furthermore, and more troubling, in the sole
case to consider questions about the rights of those determined
to be CIA targets, the D.C. district court shielded this invidious
discrimination349 behind the political question doctrine. Therefore,
the Government has made, and a court has sanctioned “as an
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race
or nationality for oppressive treatment” and has “la[id] an
unequal hand” upon al-Aulaqi.350
B.

Strict Scrutiny Applied

As in any circumstance where an invidious
discrimination is present, the Government’s differential
treatment of two classes of criminals who have committed
intrinsically the same offense must be “[narrowly] tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest.”351
While the general rule in criminal law is that “what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest
in the prosecutor’s discretion,” and that “a defendant has no
constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes
shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution,”352 that rule is
inapposite in treason cases. The Drafters of the Constitution
specifically wrote the Clause to circumscribe the state’s discretion
in even creating crimes that encroach on the gravamen of the
offense of treason. Thus, prosecutorial and legislative discretion is
uniquely at constitutional ebb when the Treason Clause comes into
play, as it is exactly the state’s almost unbridled discretion in
criminal prosecution that the Founder’s feared.
1. The Compelling Governmental Interest: National
Security
The Supreme Court has declared that the Government,
and specifically the Executive, has a compelling interest in

349
350
351
352

See supra Part III.A.
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
United States v. Batchelder, 442 US 114, 115 (1979).
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preventing acts tantamount to levying war against the United
States.353 In Korematsu v. United States, the Court noted:
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.
All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war
in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as
well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always
heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is
inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when
under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by
hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger.354

While a court considering the facts of Korematsu would
undoubtedly reach a different result today,355 the principle of
the case stands: when the Government is claiming its war
powers justify an action, even an action “inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions,”356 that action is constitutionally
permissible under strict scrutiny so long as it is proportional to
the threat.357
The Skinner equal protection analysis tends to allow the
Government significant “play in its joints.”358 However, in United
States v. Robel, the Supreme Court signaled that “the phrase ‘war
power’ cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support
any exercise of . . . power which can be brought within its ambit.
‘[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional
limitations safeguarding essential liberties.’” 359 Although the
Robel Court was discussing congressional war powers and not
executive war powers, it would be absurd to claim that even
353 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-20 (1944) (citing Executive
Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407) (“[T]he successful prosecution of the war requires
every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense
material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities.”); see also
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943).
354 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20 (applying strict scrutiny to the question of
whether, under its war powers, the Government, based on race alone, may inter the
entire population of West Coast Japanese-Americans during WWII).
355 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 199 at 715 n.45 and accompanying text
(citing Rostow, supra note 198) (“Korematsu is objectionable because the government
used race alone as the basis for predicting who was a threat to national security and
who would remain free.”).
356 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
357 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (permitting
infringements on free expression under Congress’ war power, but “no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest”).
358 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (quoting Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499,
501 (1931) (Holmes, J.)).
359 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (internal citations
omitted) (alteration in original) (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 426 (1934)).
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though Congress’ war powers are limited, the Executive may
use its powers as a talismanic incantation to eviscerate the
Constitution of all legal protections. Thus, the fact that the
Government invoked the Executive’s war powers under the
AUMF and the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers in alAulaqi v. Obama 360 does not foreclose the consideration of
whether a compelling government interest exists to justify the
killing of al-Aulaqi.
Al-Aulaqi constituted a perpetual terrorist threat
between the time he became a leader in AQAP in 2007, and his
execution in 2011. During the period where al-Aulaqi was
“leader of external operations [for AQAP],”361 he was linked to
over a dozen terrorist plots or treasonable designs and their
overt acts—such as the Fort Hood Massacre, the Times Square
Bomber, and the 2009 Christmas Day Bomber. 362 He was
especially dangerous because of his intimate knowledge of U.S.
culture and his ability to reach a widespread, English-speaking
audience.363 Therefore, under a deferential standard of review
and assuming facts favorable to the government, al-Aulaqi
could be considered a continuing threat to the security of the
United States that created a compelling government interest in
his elimination. A drone is not much different than a bomb in
terms of its effect and, thus, its proportionality.

360 Opposition
to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, V, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469) (“More broadly, the
Complaint seeks judicial oversight of the President’s power to use force overseas to
protect the Nation from the threat of attacks by an organization against which the
political branches have authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force, in
compliance with applicable domestic and international legal requirements, including
the laws of war. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (Joint Resolution of Congress signed by the President). In
addition to the AUMF, there are other legal bases under U.S. and international law for
the President to authorize the use of force against al-Qaeda and AQAP, including the
inherent right to national self-defense recognized in international law (see, e.g., United
Nations Charter Article 51). Plaintiff asks the Court to issue ex ante commands to the
President and his military and intelligence advisors about how to exercise this
authority [as commander-in-chief] . . . .”).
361 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3, at A1 (quoting President Obama), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-inyemen.html?pagewanted=all.
362 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (detailing al-Aulaqi’s
terrorist career).
363 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1381 (2011).
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2. Narrowly Tailored
As commentators have observed, al-Aulaqi was targeted
because “there was no feasible way to arrest him” and because
“he posed an imminent threat to the lives of Americans.” 364
Therefore, and in light of the increased deference shown by the
courts to the Executive in times of war,365 issuing a kill order
would likely be found a narrowly tailored action. Additionally,
the manner in which the kill order was executed was
appropriately narrowly tailored; there is hardly a more precise
and exact killing machine than a predator drone.366 Because the
asserted government interest was elimination of a security
threat,367 the Government initiated a specific military response
to completely eliminate the threat.368
CONCLUSION
The Constitution discriminates between citizens and
non-citizens who levy war against the United States by giving a
restrictive yet exhaustive definition of treason. The defined
crime may only be committed by citizens and entitles only
citizens to specific due process protections.369 The Constitution
strips from Congress and the Executive the power to define the
crime of treason or to alter its scope, and enshrines this in
Article III, for the Judiciary to guard against encroachment of
the protections provided for in the Treason Clause.
Two centuries later, by combination of executive action,
secret agency adjudication, and congressional authorization, a
citizen may be executed for levying war against the United
States with none of the constitutional protections afforded by
the Treason Clause. The Judiciary has shielded challenges to
this process as a nonjusticiable political question when the text
of Article III demonstrably commits treason administration to
Shane, supra note 326.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981); United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
366 For a thorough discussion of targeted killing processes, see Geoffrey S.
Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, And a Proposed Quantum of Information
Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 437 (2012).
367 See supra note 326 (detailing the security threat of al-Aulaqi).
368 Vlasic, supra note 14, at 330 (citing Mazzetti et al., supra note 3); see supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
369 It is a settled matter of constitutional law that only persons owing
allegiance, like citizens, are covered by the Treason Clause. See supra note 125.
Rhetorical point aside, it would also apply to persons such as legal resident aliens.
364
365
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the Judiciary. Further, the Supreme Court has not corrected its
Quirin problem, which has resulted in questionable conclusions
by the Circuits. For example, some Circuit courts have
interpreted allegiance as essential to treason by levying war, but
permitted those owing allegiance to be processed without
Treason Clause protections. They have done so because the
crimes charged, while substantively the same as treason by
levying war, were indiscriminate with respect to allegiance. It
seems as though courts have eschewed the reasoning that
predicated the inclusion of the Treason Clause in the
Constitution and ignored the maxim, “[w]hen anything is
prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.”370
As a policy matter, al-Aulaqi was driving in a car on a
deserted highway at the time that he was executed. Not every
U.S. citizen that preaches jihad is a military threat to the
United States. Looking forward, how does one resolve this
issue of whom the government may kill via a drone strike?
The coordinate branches of government may resolve
these issues by adopting the following suggestions. The Court
may solve the Quirin problem in the Circuits by adopting the
readings of Bollman, Wiltberger, Quirin, and Cramer proposed
in this note. As to the policy question, this note supports the
proposal that the CIA is allowed to carry out its macabre task,
but not unilaterally. The issue is not with these operations
being carried out, but with who orders them to be carried out.
Some court must approve petitions for kill warrants of U.S.
citizens. The Judiciary must satisfy its Article III obligations,
such as the requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act,
instead of delegating them to another branch’s agencies.
Exercising its Article III power over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, Congress may pass a statute that creates a
judicial process where secret, ex parte review is given to
wartime kill order cases like that of al-Aulaqui. Thus, the
Government may be able to maintain secrecy where necessary
and the Judiciary may discharge its Article III obligations
before action is taken against a citizen.
If nothing else, the Treason Clause—and its specific
allocation of the responsibility for resolving treason cases to
every branch other than the Executive—means that the
President, and those who serve at his pleasure, should not act
as prosecutor, defense counsel, judge, jury, and executioner,
370 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1863 (9th ed. 2009) (“[Q]uando aliquid
prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum.”).
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especially in secret. There needs to be some action to curtail the
incipient erosion of Treason Clause protections, lest the United
States revert to the state of treason law in England before the
Statute of Edward III: the assignment of unreviewable death
sentences by unilateral executive whim.
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